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Abstract
Donors have been increasingly using budget support since 2000 to associate development
aid delivery with improved development institutions and good policies that will ensure
aid effectiveness, in particular in West Africa Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)
countries. There is however little evidence that budget support promotes good policies
and institutions in WAEMU countries. The purpose of this quantitative research was to
explore relationships between budget support as an official development assistance
modality and public expenditures efficiency as an indicator of public governance quality.
The aid effectiveness theoretical framework developed by Cordello and Dell ’Ariccia
informed research questions to determine whether budget support generates efficiency
gains or losses in public governance quality measured by government spending efficiency
in recipient countries. The study used a time series cross-sectional design with 8
WAEMU countries which benefited from budget support between 1995 and 2015. Panel
regressions were used to test relationships between public expenditure efficiency and
budget support variables. Findings indicate that the use of budget support by donors and
proportion of budget support amount in government revenues and in total aid predict
public expenditures efficiency. This prediction is mediated by initial level of efficiency
and moderated by political context. The findings provide evidence for aid providers to
use budget support to stimulate public governance quality in the neediest and most poorly
governed countries and improve aid effectiveness in terms of aid amount that reaches the
poorest.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Introduction
Official development assistance (ODA or development aid) is an important
revenue source that could compensate the shortage of government revenues in developing
countries and thus support the production of public goods (Molenaers, 2012). ODA may
take various forms including funds (grants or borrowings), technical support, policy
advice, and cooperation partnerships. Donors could provide aid directly to governments
or through intermediaries such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) considered that ODA
integrates a grant element, meaning that donor support should be rewarded mainly
regarding generated economic development and welfare improvements in developing
countries. According to the OECD (2005), loans from developed to developing countries
can constitute ODA when recipient countries only partially reimburse them, the nonreimbursed component being the grant element. This led policymakers and academics
from developed and developing countries to scrutinize the term aid effectiveness, that is
how and the extent to which foreign aid contributes to advance development in aid
recipient countries.
Insufficient savings in developing nations was the primary purpose of
development assistance in line with the Harrod-Domar economic growth model which
considers savings as the main economic growth driver (Hansen, 2000). The “Marshall
Plan” initiated in the aftermath of the Second World War responded to this purpose of
supplementing the impressive destruction of capital during the war in European countries.
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Since the initiation of this Marshall Plan followed by ODA delivered to NonEuropean countries, academics and policymakers from developed and developing
countries have debated the effectiveness of ODA in producing development outcomes
such as economic growth and social improvement. Aid effectiveness has shaped
international development and the positioning of the international community in terms of
development challenges. The United Nations summit on Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs) organized in 2010 put a focus on development aid effectiveness. It called upon
international development stakeholders to exert efforts to improve the outcomes of ODA,
mainly regarding accelerated poverty reduction and reduced inequality both within and
between states. The Busan declaration on development effectiveness, adopted by
stakeholders in 2011, further emphasizes this political agenda by strengthening the Paris
declaration framework and Accra Agenda for Action on aid effectiveness enacted in 2005
and 2008 respectively. This Busan policy framework is a commitment to a
comprehensive approach to aid development with a shift from aid to development
effectiveness. The latter involves shared accountability, ownership of development
strategies by aid recipients, results-based management, and harmonization between aid
providers. This indicates stronger constraints on political leaders and decision-makers to
increase the effectiveness of public policies. Development aid as an essential component
of international cooperation should be justified to be legitimate.
An impressive academic literature was developed from the beginning of 90s on
aid effectiveness as little development progress was seen in aid recipient countries, in
particular in Sub-Saharan Africa. According to Hansen (2000), a seeming consensus
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amongst donors emerged from this debate on aid effectiveness that ODA is useful only in
the presence of quality institutions and when recipient governments implement the right
development policies. The OECD development assistance committee donors (OECDDAC) and other multilateral donors like the European Commission and World Bank have
oriented ODA to confer a greater importance to aid delivery modalities that should incite
for governance improvements. Budget support is one of these development aid modalities
that aid providers have used increasingly. Donors perceived this aid modality as relevant
in the context of Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness adopted in 2005, which defines
conditions of aid effectiveness by emphasizing various principles including ownership of
an unique development agenda by recipient countries, alignment of donors to this unique
development framework, and coordination and mutual accountability for results based
management.
In this context, scholars like Tavakoly and Gregory (2013) have argued that
budget support can contribute to the Paris declaration principles such as better alignment
of development assistance to recipient country’s development agenda; strengthening
national ownership; better harmonization between donors; and improved fiscal
management. The idea that budget support explicitly targets the improvement of
institutions and public policymaking in recipient countries has been little investigated and
discussed by academics and policymakers. There is still a controversy surrounding what
constitutes a right institution that favors development, but also with regards to the role
politics and policies should play in association with systems in the development process.
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This research contributes to the literature on aid and governance by focusing on
budget support and its relationship with quality of public governance, measured by
efficiency of public expenditure according to the West Africa Economic and Monetary
Union (WAEMU). Budget support is a specific aid delivery in which donors and aid
recipients agree to associate aid amount disbursement with policy reform agendas
(European Commission, 2012). It is in line with the policy conditionality view that
donors can use aid to generate enough incentives for institutional quality and sound
policies. While there are various conceptual frameworks for operationalizing good
governance in literature, this research adopts the pragmatic view of developmental
management. It therefore approaches quality governance through public expenditure
efficiency to reflect improvements in policymaking and institutional quality among aid
recipient countries that budget support may generate. Donors’ view that aid delivered
through budget support could be more efficient than other aid modalities indicate that
there are institutional changes budget support can generate for improved management of
public expenditures and dynamic allocation of government revenues including aid.
Therefore, the focus of this research is to provide insights regarding the extent to which
budget support result in improved public governance through efficiency gains or losses in
government spending in WAEMU countries. Potentially, the study could generate new
knowledge to inform aid providers and recipients regarding ways to improve aid practice
and development effectiveness. The study could also explain the debate whether to afford
aid allocation to the most corrupt recipient countries, which are also for many the
neediest.
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The next section will explain the background of the study. It will be followed by
the problem statement, theoretical framework, and purpose of the study. Research
questions and hypotheses will be discussed, followed by the nature of the study. This
chapter also covers theoretical constructs and assumptions and limitations as well as the
study’s thematic, geographical, and chronological scope and delimitations of the
research. The last section is a summary.
Background
Aid effectiveness is subject to intense controversies. In 2000, Burnside and Dollar
advanced that aid is effective when the recipient implements right policies and has
appropriate institutions in place. While, Burnside and Dollar (2000) said that aid did not
affect governance although governance conditioned aid effectiveness, researchers like
Asongu (2013), Easterly and Williamson (2011), Faye and Niehaus (2011), Nunn and
Qian (2014); Kalyvitis and Vlachaki (2012) pointed out the institutional perils of aid by
insisting on its failure to build quality institutions and incite right policies.). Other
researchers like Molenaers, Dellepiane, and Fraust, (2015), Kalyvitis, Stengos and
Vlachaki (2012) and Mounir (2015) considered that institutional quality and proper
systems could positively mediate aid effectiveness.
Notwithstanding this dispute between optimistic and pessimist scholars on aid
effectiveness, the OECD-DAC donors and multilateral donors such as the European
Development Fund and the World Bank have developed policy-based aid modalities such
as budget support with the purpose to influence public governance quality in recipient
countries. Budget support is an aid modality that consists of providing financial resources
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directly into recipients’ public budgets, within an agreed policy framework, which is
known as policy conditionality (Hayman, 2011). According to the European Commission
(2012), the policy conditionality framework is designed by the donor to motivate
recipient governments to promote appropriate governance settings and policymaking that
ensure aid effectiveness. Scholars’ attempts to assess the effectiveness of budget support
have considered various Paris declaration principles. Swedlund (2013) advanced that
budget support was used to influence policy choices in recipient countries. Hayman
(2011) said that (donors use budget support to impose their political views in recipient
countries mainly regarding the promotion of democratic institutions (Hayman, 2011).
Tavakoly and Smith (2013) argued that budget support can improve public financial
management while generating transaction costs. Selaya and Thiele (2012) found that
budget support deteriorates bureaucratic efficacy.
Bourguignon and Platteau (2015) argued that aid is subject to decreasing
productivity margins. Therefore, a donors’ policy concern is the possibility that budget
support as an aid modality generates constant or increasing productivity margins to
ensure continued aid effectiveness during the advent of increasing aid. One way of
perceiving this nondecreasing marginal return is the enhanced efficient use of
development assistance and public revenues in such a way that increasing aid availability
is associated with aid effectiveness. Bourguignon and Plateau developed a theoretical
framework in which governance was endogenous in the sense that the aid provider relies
on disciplining measures to influence governance setting in recipient countries. However,
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they did not empirically assess their assumption that disciplinary measures imposed by
donors can improve public governance in recipient countries.
As illustrated by the studies reviewed above, the existing literature on aid
effectiveness overlooked the possibility that policy-based development assistance such as
budget support could generate an overall government spending efficiency (improved
public governance) that may result in improved aid effectiveness. This mediation role of
public governance through public expenditure efficiency could provide insights on the
appropriateness of budget support as a means to respond to donors’ concern that is to
associate need and governance in aid delivery (Collier, 2007).
Government spending efficiency as a measure of public governance is an
indicator of the quality of policy and institutions. Public expenditures efficiency can
indicate institutional quality changes that aid generates. As Hyman (2014) noted,
governments intervene with domestic markets to mobilize resources and use them to
produce public goods and services. Unlike with market-based allocations, political rules
such as parliament votes, or executive orders determine the production of public goods
through public policymaking and budgeting processes. According to Hyman (2014), a
primary concern regarding social welfare improvement is therefore to make government
interventions for resource allocation efficient.
If donors should use aid to advance sound policies and democratic governance,
assistance should result in promoting values underlining democracy and good
policymaking, one of these being the efficient allocation of resources for improved
collective wellbeing. According to Edwards (2015), a normative view of aid policy and
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practices some academics and policymakers have defended is that aid is relevant to help
advance both public governance and development. It implies that, donors can allocate aid
to countries with weak governance which also appear to be the poorest. Aid is an entry
point donor can use to establish policy dialogue with aid recipients in order to influence
public governance in the most poorly governed countries. Acemoglu et al. (2014) have
demonstrated that there is a correlation (if not causality) between quality institutions and
sound policies and economic development. By using aid to promote good governance in
aid recipient countries, donors can sustain development which is the main aid outcome.
Whether budget support as an aid modality improves public institutions and policies in
the least developed countries is the central concern of this dissertation.
The subregion of the West Africa Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)),
composed of eight countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Mali,
Niger, Senegal and Togo) sharing a common currency is used in this case study.
According to the West Africa Central Bank (2016), , WAEMU has benefited from a
sustained influx of budget support since 1995. Between 2000 and 2015, the eight
countries together attracted a total of XOF 6493 billion of ODA in the form of budget
support. This amount represents 6% of total government revenues, 26% of the public
deficit, and 42% of total grant aid received by countries during the period. This study is
an empirical analysis of the conditions of this budgetary support WAEMU benefited from
to indicate the extent to which this budget support was an incentive to strengthen public
governance in WAEMU countries.
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Problem Statement
In the context of the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness, promoting useful aid
is a concern for donors. At the same time, the role of incentives in recipient countries has
become central to the donors’ quest for aid effectiveness, and many donors consider
ODA as a means to promote right policies and institutional qualities. This is illustrated by
the formulation of budget support by the OECD-DAC members as a new policy-based
aid modality and its increasing use by many OECD-DAC members since 2000.
Donors’ expectation that increasing use of budget support makes aid more
effective implies that the practice of budget support should relate to good public
governance, measured by the efficiency of public expenditures. Donors expect that aid
delivered through budget support generates better payoffs than if they offered this
assistance through project aid or other aid modalities. A government that benefits from
budget support should spend public revenues including development aid more efficiently
than a state that does not or mainly relies on project aid. Intuitively, one could expect that
the higher the share of budget support of total ODA from which a government benefits,
the more efficient this government should be in delivering public services, since budget
support should reward sound public policies and appropriate governance settings.
Bourguignon and Platteau (2013) said that increased aid availability can result in aid
ineffectiveness, due to decreasing productivity margin of aid amount. However,
according to the World Bank (2006), budget support could increase the volatility of aid
flows, raise fiduciary risks, increase transaction costs in the short term, and reduce
incentives for public administration departments to advance reforms in sectoral policy
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areas. Quibria (2014) noted that aid recipient countries could abnegate the
implementation of the budget support policy reform agenda once they benefited from
disbursements. The actual efficiency gain or loss that budget support may generate is
therefore unclear.
There is little scholarly empirical analysis of the relationship between budget
support and public governance in recipient countries, in particular WAEMU countries.
Existing studies do not address specific causal relationships between budget support and
the Paris Declaration principles they had in focus. These studies did not address the
efficiency of public service delivery that budget support effectiveness implicitly suggests.
The exploration of the extent to which budget support is successful or not in
improving the efficiency of delivering public services in aid recipient countries may
result in new insights into conditions involving aid effectiveness. Therefore, the focus of
this research will be to explore relationships between budget support and public
expenditure efficiency in the WAEMU as a new step in understanding the extent to which
budget support can help promote good governance for enhanced aid effectiveness.
Theoretical Framework
The aid effectiveness theoretical framework developed by Cordello and Dell
’Ariccia inspired this research. Cordello and Dell ’Ariccia (2007) assume that aid
effectiveness depends on developmental preferences and priorities of the aid recipient.
They developed an analytical framework to determine the optimal choice between two
aid modalities, which are budget support and project aid, based on the developmental
preferences aid recipients displayed. They demonstrated that budget support is the
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optimal choice for donors when total ODA is relatively low compared to the recipient’s
resources and in situations where the recipient has a strong developmental preference.
Project assistance is preferable to budget support for large-scale programs and when the
preferences of donors and recipients are misaligned.
Cordello and Dell ’Ariccia’s aid effectiveness theory indicates that aid fungibility
depends on the capacity of the aid recipient to substitute its domestic resources for aid.
When project aid is relatively low compared to the recipient’s domestic resources, or the
recipient’s developmental preference is high, the aid recipient can reallocate its resources
away from the aid-funded project. If, conversely, the project aid is large enough, the aid
recipient should have enough domestic resources or high development preference to be
able to carry out a reallocation equivalent to the aid amount. Regarding budget support,
the aid recipient can operate aid fungibility whatever the aid amount it benefits from and
depending on its developmental preferences.
The second issue Cordello and Dell ’Ariccia’s aid effectiveness theory indicates is
the role of good governance in aid effectiveness. Aid recipient’s developmental
preferences can refer to the policy environment, hence the underlying institutional quality
necessary for budget support to be effective. Since the donor’s choice of aid modality
depends on the recipient’s developmental preference, the optimal choice of aid modality
by a donor to ensure aid effectiveness is, therefore, highly dependent on the quality of
governance in the aid recipient country.
Cordello and Dell ’Ariccia’s aid effectiveness theory makes it possible to
empirically investigate practices involving budget support, notably its association with
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quality of governance in WAEMU countries. With the budget support aid modality, the
aid recipient government spend the aid amount using its own policies and rules. Policy
conditions are meant to improve institutions, policies and rules in aid recipient countries
to ensure that the aid amount provided by the donor is used efficiently by the recipient for
enhanced development outcomes. Koeberle, Stavreski and Walliser (2006) indicated that
budget support “is typically based on an agreed set of performance indicators in the form
of institutional or policy reform measures or outcome indicators” (p. 6). Since WAEMU
countries benefited from budget support between 1995 and 2015, these countries can
serve to assess the conditions under which donors delivered this support by analyzing
associations between the practice of budget support and quality of public spending in
these countries.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this research is to quantitatively examine relationships between
budget support and public governance, measured in terms of public expenditure
efficiency for aid recipient countries in the WAEMU. The study will describe the
importance of ODA and budget support in particular in the WAEMU region and
elucidate the magnitude of changes in public expenditures that budget support generated.
It will further explain causal relationships between budget support and government
spending efficiency, by using control variables to ensure other potential factors
contributing to public expenditure efficiency are incorporated in the analysis.
The research also includes methodological contributions to the analysis of budget
support effectiveness with a specific application to WAEMU countries. The research
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used public expenditure efficiency that measures by relating human development
composite index to public expenditures in WAEMU countries. The human development
composite index combines three outcome measures which are economic development,
education, and health.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
This study will provide answers to the following research questions along with
related hypotheses.
RQ1: Is there a relationship between the use of budget support by donors in
WAEMU countries over time and quality of their public governance?
H01: There is no relationship between the use of budget support in WAEMU
countries over time and quality of public governance.
Ha1: There is a relationship between the use of budget support in WAEMU
countries over time and quality of public governance.
RQ2: Is there a relationship between the absolute amount of budget support
WAEMU governments receive and the quality of service delivery?
H02: There is no relationship between the absolute amount of budget support
WAEMU governments receive and the quality of their public service delivery.
Ha2: There is a relationship between the absolute amount of budget support
WAEMU governments receive and the quality of their public service delivery.
RQ3: Is there a relationship over time between the proportion of budget support in
terms of total aid in WAEMU countries and quality of public governance?
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H03: There is no relationship over time between the proportion of budget support
in terms of total aid in WAEMU countries and quality of public governance.
Ha3: There is a relationship over time between the proportion of budget support in
terms of total aid in WAEMU countries and quality of governance.
RQ4: Is there a relationship over time between the share of budget support
amount in terms of total government revenue in WAEMU countries and quality of public
governance?
H04: There is no relationship over time between the share of budget support
amount in terms of total government revenue in WAEMU countries and quality of their
public governance.
Ha4: There is a relationship over time between the share of budget support
amount in terms of total government revenue in WAEMU countries and quality of their
public governance.
RQ5: Does initial level of institutional quality affect the prediction of the quality
of public governance by budget support?
H05: Initial level of institutional quality does not affect prediction of quality of
public governance by budget support.
Ha5: Initial level of institutional quality affect the prediction of the quality of
public governance by budget support.
RQ6: Does political context measured in terms of level of democratization affect
the prediction of the quality of public governance, measured by the efficiency of public
expenditures, by budget support in WAEMU countries over time?
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H06: Political context measured in terms of level of democratization does not
affect the prediction of the quality of public governance by budget support in WAEMU
countries.
Ha6: Political context measured in terms of level of democratization affects the
prediction of the quality of public governance by budget support in WAEMU countries.
Nature of the Study
The study is quantitative and will use a quasi-experimental design to respond to
the central research question: to understand the extent to which changes in budget support
results in changes in institutional quality, measured by public expenditure efficiency in
WAEMU countries. According to Campbell and Stanley (1963), there is both a
correlational and causal dimension in quasi-experimental. design, I used to examine the
extent to which variations in budget support policy predict changes in public expenditure
efficiency in WAEMU countries.
Government spending efficiency (GSE) is the measure of public governance
quality used as the dependent variable in this study. GSE will be estimated using
stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). A measure of human development will be related to
measures of gross domestic product, public expenditures, macroeconomic stability, and
measures of population and density. The results of the SFA will be GSE scores for each
of the WAEMU countries over 1995-2015.
Budget support variables used in this study are budget support dummy, budget
support absolute amount, the proportions of budget support in terms of total a country
receives and total government revenues in each of the WAEMU countries. Effects of
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budget support on public governance quality will be studied in terms of relationships
between budget support variables and GSE scores. The test of the hypotheses regarding
relationships between budget support variables and GSE scores will consist of regressing
GSE scores against budget support variables using panel data regression involving both
fixed and random-effects models. Panel regressions will also be used to test for mediation
and moderation of selected variables like initial level of public governance quality, and
political context in terms of democratization and political stability in relation to
efficiency. The introduction in the panel regressions of covariates (macroeconomic
stability, corruption, development level) that may influence institutional quality measured
by public expenditure efficiency, along with the primary explanatory variables of budget
support policy, will control for potential confounding factors in explaining public
expenditures efficiency. This procedure of using covariates in panel regressions will
result in an explanatory design for an examination of the likelihood of a causal
relationship between budget support and public expenditure efficiency in WAEMU
countries.
Definitions
Aid: Foreign support that developing countries receive from other institutions to
sustain the implementation of their development agendas (OECD, 2005). There are
various ways of delivering aid including project and program aid, policy-based financing,
and budget support.
Aid modality: The policy or strategy that a donor uses to deliver aid to recipients.
There are two main aid modalities which are project aid and budget support.
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Budget support: is an aid modality that consists of transferring financial resources
directly into recipients’ public budgets to support a medium-term program (Hayman,
2011).
Conditionality: incentive measures (positive and negative) the aid provider
donor, and the aid recipient agree upon within the framework of an aid contract (Koch,
2015).
Public governance: Institutional arrangements that frame public decision making
and actions (United Nations, 2007). According to the OECD (2011), the principal
elements of public governance are accountability, transparency, efficiency, effectiveness,
responsiveness, and rule of law.
Public expenditure efficiency: The capacity of a government to allocate or spend
available resources in such a way that there is no possibility to improve an individual’s
wellbeing without deteriorating another’s situation in the given constituency (Hyman,
2014).
Assumptions
The overall assumption behind this study was that any amount of aid delivered
through budget support indicates the donor’s intention to influence governance set in the
recipient countries. As underlined earlier, donors use budget support to improve aid
effectiveness by inciting aid recipients to improve their institutions and policies. It is also
assumed that any disbursement made by a donor within budget support framework is an
indication of an agreement between the donor and the recipient to implement various
policy reforms in the recipient country in terms of public governance quality. This
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assumption means that ceteris paribus, an additional unit of aid amount delivered through
budget support is also a proxy of other policy inputs the aid recipient government
commits to implement in performing public service. There is no distinction between
sectoral and general budget support in this study.
The assumption behind the choice of government spending efficiency as the
dependent variable was that the primary objective of improving governance setting in
recipient countries is to ensure that they spend public revenues in a well-organized
manner. The role of a responsible and accountable government in a modern democratic
society is to ensure that resources are allocated efficiently for collective wellbeing. The
idea that donors can influence the emergence of responsible governments through budget
support in recipient countries translates the use of disciplining measures by donors to
incite aid recipient governments to allocate and spend public resources including
development assistance efficiently. As an implication, it was also assumed that aid
recipients spend budget support amount in the same manner they spend total government
revenues, in line with the principle of fungibility.
Scope and Delimitations
This study focuses on the role of public governance quality on aid effectiveness.
The focus of the study was about budget support as a specific aid modality. Donors
design budget support to influence quality of institutions in aid recipient countries. The
hypotheses of the study will be tested on the West Africa Economy and Monetary Union.
This currency area has regional rules and policies to harmonize public finance data.
Finally, the study covered budgets in these countries between 1995 and 2015. Since 2015,
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methodological changes were introduced in the preparation of public budgets in
WAEMU. Available budget data from 2015 might not be comparable to 1995-2015 data.
Limitations
The study used public expenditure efficiency coefficient of which estimate was
based on a policy outcome index that synthesizes human development indicators such as
economic development level, health and education conditions. By participating in the
adoption of the Millennium Declaration in 2000 by the United Nations and the MDGs in
2002, which aimed to orient aid delivery, WAEMU countries committed to advance
human wellbeing as their primary development objectives over the period of study.
However, in practice, aid recipients like WAEMU countries may have developmental and
non-developmental preferences. WAEMU countries might allocate their resources to
unproductive programs. They could also implement policies which cause harm instead of
advancing human development.
Additionally, a limitation of the study is its geographical restriction that may
affect the generalizability of the findings. Since the WAEMU is a currency zone, this
may have some influences on the results. Therefore, the results of the study might not be
generalizable to countries which do not have the common or harmonized fiscal, monetary
and foreign exchange policies as those required in a monetary union.
Significance
This research will contribute to literature regarding aid effectiveness and the
efficacy of budget support as a form of aid modality. This research involves time series
cross sectional design and will provide new cross-country insights regarding the use of
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budget support by donors as an efficient aid form. The study could improve donors’
knowledge of whether countries with more performant governance systems measured by
their GSE coefficients are those that benefit from budget support and whether countries
that receive budget support strengthen their systems in terms of efficient public service
delivery. Therefore, donors may get new insights to better orient practices involving
budget support and decide whether and when they could be confident in the governance
setting in aid recipient countries to adequately substitute project aid for budget support.
Therefore, the study may contribute to social change by explaining possibilities for
donors to allocate more ODA through budget support in respect to one of the implications
of the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness, which requires donors to deliver ODA
through recipient countries’ systems.
This research may lead to a better understanding of the actual outcome in terms of
institutional quality of donors’ immersion into aid recipient’s policy environments. This
research may provide indications regarding whether motives of all stakeholders involved
in public policymaking in recipient countries result in expected efficiency gains in terms of
public service delivery in recipient countries.
By using human development index to measure the public expenditure efficiency
coefficient that serves as the dependent variable, the study implicitly informs
policymakers in aid recipient countries and external donors regarding the relevance of
using budget support to achieve social outcomes such as recently adopted sustainable
development goals (SDGs). A useful implication of the study would be to explain
whether donors can rely on budget support as a tool for need-governance tradeoff in
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delivering aid. Donors can be confident in providing more resources through budget
support to the neediest countries which are also the worst governed.
Summary
There are controversies on aid effectiveness amongst public policymakers and
academics. An important topic in recent literature on aid effectiveness has been the
possible influential role of aid in improving public governance n recipient countries.
There is an opposition between scholars who claim the institutional perils and policyneutrality of ODA and optimists who perceive aid as a means to promote right policies
and institutions in aid recipient countries. The optimistic view seems to have influenced
many donors in designing and implementing new policy-based instruments such as
budget support to deliver aid.Yet existing limited academic literature on budget support
offers an incomplete view of the effectiveness of budget support in promoting
institutional quality and better aid effectiveness. This study will contribute to assessments
of the relationship between aid and governance, with an emphasis on budget support and
governance in WAEMU countries. It is a scholarly attempt to search for improved aid
outcomes through assessments of aid-driven institutional quality. The research may
therefore provide insights regarding possibilities for donors and aid recipients to use
budget support as an aid delivery modality to promote positive social change through
improved public governance in aid recipient countries.
In Chapter 2, there will be a review of existing literature on aid effectiveness,
beginning with a brief description of the origin of aid and its evolution. The chapter will
cover recent studies that emphasized relationships between foreign support and
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governance to allow the identification of theoretical grounds in terms of how and to what
extent aid can affect institutions and policies in recipient countries. The aid effectiveness
theoretical framework developed by Cordello and Dell ’Ariccia, will frame this study.
There will be a discussion of the state of recent research on budget support effectiveness
and implications for this study. Finally, the literature review will link aid effectiveness
with selected public administration theories namely institutional analysis and
development framework, innovation and diffusion model and transaction cost approach
for hypotheses that are tested in this study.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
In the existing literature, scholars have investigated the role of governance and
institutional quality regarding aid effectiveness in two main directions. In the first
approach, institutional settings in potential aid recipient countries were considered
exogenous, and donors chose aid recipient based on their apparent merit of public
governance quality or politics. In the second approach, institutions in recipient countries
were endogenous. Donors can impose disciplinary measures or conditionalities to
improve institutional quality in recipient countries resulting in reinforced aid outcomes.
The theoretical framework for this research is the aid effectiveness theory
developed by Cordello and Dell’ Ariccia. This framework involves assessing how aid
allocation generates incentives for aid effectiveness. With this theoretical foundation, the
study considers the potential of budget support to stimulate positive institutional change
and appropriate policy reforms. Guided by the theoretical foundation, the literature
review will illustrate two dimensions of institutional quality before explaining
specificities of budget support. In the last section of the literature review, the relationship
between the aid effectiveness theory and practice and selected public administration
theories is reviewed to discuss research questions and hypotheses.
Literature Assessment Approach
The first step in the literature review involved a database search on aid
effectiveness. Political Science Complete, Academic Search Complete, Policy Studies
Journal, SAGE, and JSTOR were used to get an overview of scholarly studies from 2011
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through to 2016. Search phrases were aid theory, official development assistance theory,
development aid effectiveness, development assistance effectiveness, foreign aid
effectiveness, budget support effectiveness, program aid effectiveness, public
expenditures efficiency, government spending efficiency, aid effectiveness politics, aid
economics, political economics of aid effectiveness, aid and institutions, aid and
governance, aid and Africa, aid and West Africa, Aid and WAEMU, budget support and
Africa, budget support and West Africa, budget support and WAEMU, program aid and
Africa, program aid and West Africa, program aid and WAEMU. Scholarly studies on
politics of aid effectiveness were obtained from SAGE, Academic Search Complete,
Policy Studies Journal and Political Science. Results of search in JSTOR were scholarly
studies on economics and political economics of aid effectiveness, institutions and
governance, methodological aspects of institutional quality and efficiency.
Furthermore, studies identified through various searches were used to deepen the
literature review as they made it possible to locate complementary academic works which
were relevant to the investigation. There were also books involving ODA, public policy
and finance, public administration, and quantitative research. Reports from various
international organizations such as the OECD, World Bank, and United Nations, which
play a significant role in shaping ODA, were consulted. The literature review also
included reports and studies on the WAEMU. A literature review matrix was used to
summarize the content of studies.
The following subsection of the literature review is a review of the theoretical
foundation of the study. The next section is an analysis of the role of institutional quality
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in promoting aid effectiveness. Since budget support is an aid modality, this section is
used to analyze the possibility that other policy inputs such as quality public service
delivery and politics increase aid outcomes at a given level of aid amount. The
mechanisms by which budget support as a specific aid modality can result in improved
aid outcomes constitutes the main content of discussions in the budget support and
institutions subsection. In this subsection, main characteristics of budget support are
investigated with regard to interrelations with institutional quality both theoretically and
empirically. Theories involving public administration are further reviewed in the
subsection on budget support effectiveness and public administration to analyze the
complexity of institutional mechanisms that the practice of budget support can lead to. To
my knowledge, there are few empirical studies which related public administration
theories to budget support effectiveness.
Aid Effectiveness Theoretical Foundation
In the existing literature on aid effectiveness, scholars investigated aid
effectiveness from the perspective of the recipient's policy environment. In this regard,
Burnside and Dollar (2000) 's seminal work gave new impetus to the debate on the role of
the beneficiary's governance setting on aid efficiency. Researchers were also concerned
with how aid allocation, in conjunction with the policy environments of both the donor
and the recipient, can affect aid effectiveness. This discussion was mostly empirical until
the release of Cordello and Dell' Ariccia 's influential paper. In this article, Cordello and
Dell' Ariccia (2007) analyzed budget support and project modalities separately. The aid
recipient can allocate its resources on development and nondevelopment priorities. The
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donor prefers the beneficiary prioritizes production of developmental goods but can only
partially observe the recipient’s developmental preferences through capital expenditure.
Cordello and Dell’Ariccia (2007) said that budget support can result in increased
developmental goods if the donor imposes conditionality on the observable recipient’s
developmental preferences which is measured by the proportion of capital expenditures
in total government revenues. However, this conditionality will generate inefficiencies in
terms of the way the aid recipient allocates resources between developmental and
nondevelopment priorities. Conditional budget support is preferable to project aid in
terms of development production when the granted assistance is relatively low compared
to the beneficiary’s resources. Budget support also dominates project aid in terms of
development effectiveness when the aid recipient’s developmental preference is high.
In Cordello and Dell’Ariccia’s model, developmental preference was a proxy of
policy and institutional environment in the aid recipient country. Cordello and
Dell’Ariccia explain how policy and institutional environment affect the choice of donors
willing to improve aid outcomes with the choice of aid modality. By imposing
conditionality on capital expenditures, a donor can influence budget allocations in the
budget support recipient country with the view to improve aid outcomes. Cordello and
Dell' Ariccia did not, however, analyze the combination of the two aid modalities which
are budget support and project aid. The two aid modalities were discussed separately in
their theoretical framework. Conditions for the effectiveness of the imposed
conditionality on capital expenditure was not explained.
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Jelovac and Vandeninden (2008) extended Cordello and Dell’Ariccia’s model to
integrate budget support and project aid in a unique theoretical model and assess the
conditions under which budget support conditionality of is optimal. Jelovac and
Vandeninden argue that unconditional budget support is the optimal choice a donor can
make to ensure aid effectiveness. The use of conditionality by a donor is optimal when
there is an alignment between the preferences of the donor and the beneficiary, and the
productivity of the other policy inputs as well as the proportion of aid compared to the
beneficiary’s resources are high. Cordello and Dell’Ariccia’s theoretical model extended
by Jelovac and Vandeninden indicate when and how a donor can prefer budget support to
project aid. But both Cordello and Dell’Ariccia and Jelovac and Vandeninden did not
explain why in practice, as in WAEMU countries, the two aid modalities are used
simultaneously by donors for the same country. Furthermore, If donors are concerned
with aligning their preferences with those of aid recipients, several countries among the
neediest, including those in the WAEMU, would be ex-ante excluded from aid allocation
because of their weak public governance.
Mounir (2015) has developed a theoretical model in which the donor can allocate
aid by interplaying on the two aid modalities, considering the information asymmetry
concerning the recipient's preferences. The proportion of aid that benefits poor indicates
the recipient's developmental behavior. The donor does not know in advance how much
assistance the recipient will allocate to the poor due to asymmetric information. Mounir
explains that donors should use budget support to allocate aid to governments who
demonstrate a weak propensity to redistribute national income to poor. Donors can also
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use pooling aid that combines budget support and project aid as an optimal choice to
create positive incentives when the recipient has a weak propensity to redistribute income
to poor. With the pooled fund, a donor can use both exogenous selection of aid recipient
and endogenous influence on the aid recipient’s developmental preferences for aid
allocation to avoid excluding systematically the neediest countries. In this line,
Bourguignon and Platteau (2015) revisited aid effectiveness and examine how aid
availability affects aid effectiveness. Bourguignon and Platteau consider various
possibilities and implications for an aid agency that is willing to optimize its utility
function in allocating aid between two countries considering need and governance. Aid
effectiveness decreases with aid project size as leaders tend to reduce efforts or embezzle
a higher share of aid money. Whether the donor imposes disciplining measures or not on
poorly governed country, the availability of increased aid amount leads the donor to
include both wealthy and poorly governed countries in the development aid program.
However, the donor is likely to focus on better governed and wealthy nations when the
available aid amount is smaller, and public governance quality is very weak in other
countries compared to wealthy countries. These results imply that donors consider a
need-governance trade-off to promote inclusive aid programs where worst governed and
most impoverished nations would benefit from aid allocation in addition to bettergoverned countries. Bourguignon and Platteau also suggest that when the available aid
amount to the donor is small, poorest countries should reach a minimum level of public
governance quality to benefit from aid allocation. This indicates that aid can be useful in
the neediest countries if it results in improved public governance quality in these
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countries. An alternative for the donor could be to accept in the short term a level of aid
ineffectiveness while using disciplining measures to raise public governance quality to
the minimum required level in the poorest countries. While Bourguignon and Platteau did
not empirically test their analytical solutions, Dutta, Leeson, and Wiliamson (2013)’s
quantitative empirical analysis suggested that the need-governance trade-off the donor
decides depends on the existing political setting in the aid recipient country.
Development aid makes dictatorships more dictatorial and democracies more democratic.
It means that foreign assistance does not change political institutions but amplify them.
There is thus an exaggeration of the effect of aid on political institutions although these
findings imply that development aid for democratizing dictatorships may cause harm as it
can strengthen dictatorships. At the same time, an attractive political implication is that
aid can strengthen democracies in weakly democratic countries, and thus an inclusive aid
allocation is possible, as Bourguignon and Platteau suggested with their need-governance
analytical framework.
Optimistic scholars who claim aid usefulness and pessimistic academics who
defend aid ineffectiveness are reconciled with the role of institutional quality regarding
aid effectiveness in aid recipient countries. The optimistic view is adopted for this
dissertation. It is inspired by Cordello and Dell’Ariccia’s theoretical suggestion that there
may be a possibility to appropriately design and deliver aid in such a way that it
positively influences public governance quality through knowledge sharing and improve
legislative, executive and judiciary branches of democratic governments. Donors can use
aid to strengthen civil society and free press, the rule of law and limit corruption in such a
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way that aid fungibility is not associated with aid ineffectiveness. This is supported by
Morrissey (2015) who argue that there is an over-estimation of aid fungibility whereas
this latter did not reduce aid effectiveness. Donors like the OECD-DAC members have
been using budget support to promote institutional setting that ensures right policies and
institutions for increased aid effectiveness.
Aid Effectiveness, Institutions, and Policies
Originally, aid had an economic meaning as aid providers used it to sustain
economic development in the aid recipient countries. Aid effectiveness had little to do
with politics and institutions as it was made available for financing public investments,
which determine economic growth. According to Edwards (2015), development aid
emerged as an implication of the Harrod-Domar’s economic growth model. In this model,
investment and thus savings is the key ingredient development planners have to sustain
economic growth over long term. Development planners used Harrod-Domar’s economic
growth model to estimate the investment gap that a central government should mobilize
to attain an economic performance objective. Hence, in a context of insufficient domestic
savings, a government can look for external funds such as foreign aid to achieve the
planned investment level. This was illustrated by the Marshall Plan, where the United
States of America earmarked funds to help rebuild Western Europe in the aftermath of
the second world war. The American support, which included both loans and grants,
compensated to some extent the destruction of capital that had occurred during the war.
The protagonist blocs that were fighting and the neutral countries benefited from the
American aid. Population and industrial powers were part of the criteria used to allocate
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the American support to the various beneficiary countries, although the Allies members
benefited from a more significant share than the Axis countries.
The main aid outcome is thus economic growth, which also measures
development. Since saving generates economic growth, aid is therefore effective if it
compensates the shortage of savings in the recipient countries. A rich literature has
investigated both the correlation and causality between development aid and economic
growth. For instance, Limodio (2012) examined the relationship between aid and
economic growth through capital accumulation process and found that aid had a limited
contribution to economic growth. In fact, the transmission mechanism through which aid
can predict economic growth seems to be a puzzle of direct and indirect effects. Tezanos,
Quinones and Guijarro (2013) investigated this puzzle by adjusting economic growth
with economic inequality and found that aid was effective in terms of promoting
inequality-adjusted economic growth. Kalyvitis, Stengos and Vlachaki (2012) reexamined the relationship between aid and economic growth with the introduction of a
threshold effect. Their econometric analysis on 42 countries (40% were African countries
including WAEMU countries) over 1970-2000 suggests the existence of a threshold from
which aid has a significant positive effect on economic growth. The authors argued that a
minimum aid of around 3.4% of GDP is necessary to break up the vicious circle of low
savings-low growth-high poverty in developing countries. Kalyvitis, Stengos and
Vlachaki confirm Rostow (1960)’s development theory which suggests that low-income
countries needed a big push like the Marshall Plan to stimulate a sustained economic
development dynamic. These results are illustrative of controversial findings on the
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relationship between aid and aid outcome defined by economic growth. They also
exemplify the idea that economic growth and investment-saving gap mechanisms are not
enough to assess and understand aid effectiveness.
As economic theory evolved, the use of aid encompassed larger items than saving,
to cover inter alia human capital, technology and research and development. Using a
historical perspective, Edwards (2015) argued that economic developments have
influenced aid policy and practices. Donors progressively moved from the need to close
the investment gap to the funding of skills and technology in the advent of Solow’s
economic development theory in the 1980s that considers technological progress as the
engine of long-term economic growth. Tezanos, Quinones & Guijarro (2013) investigated
the contribution of development aid to human capital and total factor productivity as
means to sustain economic growth. Most recent scholar papers on aid effectiveness used
the endogenous economic growth theoretical framework, which emphasizes total factor
productivity as critical in promoting sustained economic growth in addition to physical
capital. Other factors Tezanos, Quinones & Guijarro stressed include innovation, human
capital, social capital and institutions. The emergence of conditionalities donors imposed
to aid beneficiaries introduced the role of institutions to improve aid effectiveness by
building economic institutions and conducting appropriate reforms to sustain aid
outcomes. The financial allocations criteria and the inclusive aid allocation in the
Marshall Plan, despite the American non-neutral positioning during the war, are
illustrative of this politics-free aid reasoning, while considering the role of institutions.
Conditionalities were in line with dominant economic theory which involves open
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markets, private ownership rights, and the limited role of the State in the economy. These
elements were included in the structural adjustment programs and the Washington
Consensus programs the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund supported by
OECD countries obliged many developing countries to implement. Since economic
institution building mainly relies on government’s commitment and ownership in
beneficiary countries, a participatory approach to conditioned-aid further nurtured aid
policies and debates. Beneficiary countries should therefore be in the driver’s seat to lead
and coordinate reforms and policies jointly defined with donors for aid effectiveness.
According to Edwards (2011), Through these programs, recipient countries should
undertake necessary economic reforms to strengthen market economy. Aid effectiveness
is thus implicitly conditioned by the functioning of the market institution. Development
aid should thus obey the logic of the efficient allocation of resources.
The politics-free aid line gives only a partial view of aid practice since the
political economy plays a crucial role in the way aid generates expected development
outcomes. It overlooks the imbrication between economic and political institutions in aid
delivery and outcomes. Booth (2011) undertook a review of the recent literature on
development aid and explained that institutions rule played a critical role in economic
development in terms of increases of per capita growth and was a driver of the volume of
aid received. While there is no clear-cut understanding of what the right institution is, it is
known to be a function of politics and therefore politics influences aid effectiveness. One
implication from this development is that aid is unlikely to generate positive effects
without appropriate institutions and policies Williams & Copestake (2014) argued that
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development assistance should therefore be context-specific and target countries that
have the proper governance setting for its effectiveness.
Donors were encouraged in the aid allocation selectivity requirement that
countries that demonstrate good governance and quality institutions deserve foreign
assistance. Donors have then used the existence and level of democratic governance and
systems to select aid recipients. Winters and Martinez (2015) performed linear
regressions and statistical compositional analysis covering 121 countries including most
African countries and argue that poorly governed countries receive fewer aid flows.
Donors’ preferences regarding aid modalities and sector allocations are a function of the
beneficiary’s governance performance. Donors used programmatic aids in bettergoverned countries while they preferred project aid in social sectors in poorly governed
countries. Nordveit (2014) also emphasized donors’ tendency to adapt aid modality to
governance quality level in recipient countries by computing the probability that 23
bilateral aid providers use budget support in 115 countries including 47 African countries
and 8 WAEMU countries. Donors were likely to use budget support in better-governed
countries. The latter were also likely to benefit from higher shares of budget support.
Clist, Isopi and Morissey (2012) applied a contract-based theoretical framework to 88
recipients including 32 African countries (7 WAEMU countries were covered) and found
that there was no significant relationship between the amount of budget support and
government effectiveness, even though government effectiveness predicts the use of
budget support by donors.
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There are limitations to the robustness of these findings that purported that aid
providers mostly target less-corrupted or better-governed countries in aid allocation. An
illustration is the significant variations in findings about explanatory variables, coverage
and period the authors input in their models. Akramov (2012) noted that the
discrimination between aid recipients was more perceptible when governance gaps were
significant. By using the Freedom House scores as the predictor for 112 countries
including 47 African countries and 7 WAEMU countries, Akramov found that only
changes between categories significantly correlated with aid allocation, while slight
changes within categories were less associated to aid allocation. Another issue was the
heterogeneity between donors in the way they expressed governance-based selectivity
since their behaviors were also a function of other variables. Masaki (2016) illustrated
this issue using panel data of 478 coups (including in Africa and WAEMU countries) and
noted that donors sanctioned democratic regressions by reducing aid disbursements in the
advent of coup d’état mainly after the cold war. However, this result did not hold during
the cold war. Reactions to coups were also not uniform across bilateral donors as
countries such as the United States of America favored geostrategic determinants in their
cooperation with developing countries. Masaki concluded that this heterogeneity was
likely to weaken the effect of political conditionality on aid effectiveness. This is
worrying given the heterogeneity between donors regarding rewarding democratic
governance progress with foreign aid. Reinsberg (2015) conducted an econometric
analysis based on 174 aid recipients including most African countries and WAEMU
countries and found that bilateral donors rewarded political liberalization with increased

36
aid allocation liberalization while multilateral donors such as the World Bank did not.
Donors’ selectivity and their ability to encourage good governance is thus a function of
their own institutional constraints.
Therefore, the issue of aid effectiveness becomes more complex as it depends on
institutional settings in both donors and recipients’ countries. Easterly (2014) elucidated
the aid effectiveness complexity by arguing that aid was suffering double principal-agent
problems as taxpayers in donors’ countries and ultimate beneficiaries in recipient
countries were not involved in the aid decision making process. This complexity adds to
the unclear accountability chains between governmental donors and recipients that also
affect aid selectivity and its effectiveness. Easterly relies on this argument to justify that
aid is ineffective as a significant share of aid flows go to the most corrupted governments.
Brown and Swiss (2013) also raised this selectivity inconsistency by highlighting the
difficulty of using public governance quality to discriminate between aid orphans and aid
darlings. Many aid orphans were the neediest while public management in many aid
darlings was far from rosy. Dreher, Nunnemkamp, and Thiele (2011) used Probit and
Tobit models to confirm the selfishness and commercial self-interest of donors in
allocating aid. Dreher, Nunnemkamp, and Thiele compared emerging donors and the
OECD-DAC aid providers and argued that merit regarding better governed or less
corrupted countries was not the primary motive of aid selectivity in either of the two
groups. Also, the emerging donors displayed less concern with beneficiary needs than did
the OECD-DAC donors, since explanatory variables such as income per capita,
malnutrition or child mortality did not have a significant impact on aid allocation by
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emerging donors. Easterly and Wiliamson (2011) and de la Croix and Delavallade (2013)
also reached the same conclusions regarding inappropriate aid allocation. According to
Easterly and Williamson (2011), aid is ineffective as donors have not adjusted to the
evolution of corruption in the beneficiary countries. Donors have maintained the same
level of support to countries that have become more corrupt over time. de la Croix and
Delavallade (2013) argued that development aid inefficiency was a result of the low
productivity in nations which benefited from more aid, these countries also being the
most corrupt.
The above analyses suffered various shortcomings. The studies were based on aid
commitments and not disbursements. Amounts donors committed are sometimes not
disbursed when countries fail to meet ex-ante defined conditions. Also, the focus of these
studies on merit-based aid allocation raises a normative concern: Since governance
predicts aids, nations in acute needs should benefit from less support as they are usually
also the most poorly governed. Finally, these studies overlook the possibility that aid
improves governance setting, and thus offers opportunities to advance governance in
neediest countries.
Donors have tried to address the challenge of assisting the neediest in poorly
governed environments by bypassing state organizations. Detrich (2013) noted that
donors were likely to rely on non-state actors and bypass states in poorly governed
countries. The involvement of independent nonprofits in aid delivery is politically
attractive to donors as it is meant to show the donors’ goodwill. Niskanen (1968) has
formulated a theoretical framework of bureaucracy, which specifies that a rational
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bureaucrat would support inefficiency by looking for increasing budget allocations to
achieve a given objective. This suggests that the promotion of competition between
bureaus for budget allocation will provide an incentive for efficiency. According to
Ulbaek & Nohr, (2014), a viable approach government developed with the view to
improve public service delivery is public nonprofit partnerships. Donors could expect
improving aid effectiveness by creating competition between governmental bureaus and
nonprofit organizations for aid allocation.
However, this approach can result in fragmented and uncoordinated aid, which is
also a source of inefficiency. According to Molenaers, Jacobs & Dellepiane (2013),
fragmented aid through the intermediation of multiple Non-Governmental Organizations
may be ineffective as Non-Governmental Organizations have their own motives, which
may affect the way they deliver assistance to beneficiary countries. Further,
uncoordinated assistance may generate significant transaction cost that affects aid
effectiveness. Bigsten and Tengstam (2013) supported this idea by quantifying the
potential benefit of aid coordination and noted that aid coordination through a focus on
fewer countries and shift from project aid to program aid could generate significant gains
in aid effectiveness. This benefit can outweigh transaction costs as well as the high
political cost of aid coordination. Bigsten and Tengstam went further to suggest that an
appropriate coordination can result in reallocating 50% of available aid from aid darlings
to orphans with significant potential efficiency gains. However, the efficiency gain
depends on the governance situation and donors can therefore not assure such a gain for
certain reallocations, such as from aid darlings to lousy aid orphans. Bigsten and
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Tengstam’s findings did not cover the possibility that donors influence governance in
either of the aid orphan or darling countries. Also, it is not clear whether the size of the
donor's club matters for the efficiency gains aid coordination can generate. There is also
heterogeneity in donors’ behaviors which may suggest that the type of aid providers
would influence the potential efficiency gains. If donors must assist the neediest while aid
effectiveness is subject to institutional quality, donors need to influence governance
quality in beneficiary countries. The endogeneity of aid allocation to improve governance
setting in recipient countries was also the concerns of some scholars. Molenaers,
Dellepiane, and Faust (2015) explained that political conditionality emerged in response
to worries about the mediating effects of recipient politics and institutions on aid
effectiveness. Aid has entered a new age of ex-post conditionality. In this sense, donors
and policy makers perceived assistance as a tool to influence political changes and
generate governance improvements. However, how governance and which aspects of
public management mediate aid effectiveness is still unclear. The successful
implementation of the right institutions through aid conditionality has been a subject of
intense debates.
Some scholars such as Asongu (2013) have used various analytical framework to
argue against the institutional building propensity of aid. A critical theoretical argument
built on the established resource curse theory to depict the institutional peril of aid in
developing countries. Aid is perceived as a rent that follows the same logic of the natural
resources curse. According to this political aid curse theory, foreign aid is detrimental to
institutions, deteriorates accountability, encourages rent-seeking behaviors, generates
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conflict for internal aid allocation, disincentives recipient governments regarding
appropriate reforms, increases corruption, and undermines the rule of law. Using a panel
design of 53 African countries Asongu (2013) suggested that foreign aid negatively and
significantly affects various indicators of institutional quality for quintiles of institutional
quality. With their foreign assistance, donors thus contribute to deteriorate the
institutional quality irrespective of institutional development in recipient countries. Along
the same lines, Kalyvitis and Vlachaki (2012) said that aid did not encourage democratic
accountability. Aid tends to release budgetary pressures on governments and weaken
governmental accountability and citizens control.
Other scholars like Jones and Tarp (2015) have defended the opposite view to the
institutional perils of foreign aid. The theoretical foundation of these studies builds on the
idea that aid is more conditional, less fungible and less reliable than oil revenues and
should not result in political resource curse as natural resources. By using long-run crosssectional and panel designs, Jones and Tarp suggested a small but definite effect of aid on
political institutions, arguing that aid may compensate the political cost to the leader of
improving governance systems. Different aid modalities affect political systems in
different ways. In this sense Jones and Tarp negated the theory of the institutional perils
of aid and concluded there is no systemic adverse assistance effect on institutions.
However, Jones and Tarp (2015) used a confusing concept of governance aid which
included human rights, civil society, and institutional development. Their analyses
considered commitments rather than disbursements. The study also lacks solid theoretical
ground as the Jones and Tarp used agnostic stance and argued that there is no clear-cut
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method of estimation in the literature. Altincekic and Bearce (2014) also reached the
same conclusion of negating the institutional peril theory by quantitatively examining the
relationship between aid to various repression and appeasement indicators and running
causality tests. Altincekic and Bearce based their analyses on the rentier state theory
formalized through repression and appeasement strategies and found no evidence of
political foreign aid curse measured through repression and appeasement. Altincekic and
Bearce suggested that there was no significant correlation between aid and tax burden, no
statistically significant correlation between aid and education and health spending and no
statistically significant association between military spending and aid in non-democracy
sub-samples, but only in democracy sub-sample. In contrary to the political aid curse,
Altincekic and Bearce illustrated aid blessing: assistance increases human rights in
democracies but no effect in non-democracies, aid rises anti-government pressures, and
development aid tends to increase the political change in democracies. These results
confirm the idea that the democracy level may influence the effect of development aid on
political institutions. However, the use of aggregate data that combines grants and highly
concessional loans could have affected the results. I could suspect that a more constant
and fungible aid may generate political resource curse unless the associated
conditionalities force or incite governments for better management of public
expenditures. Faye and Niehaus (2012) showed that the political alignment between the
aid provider’s administration and recipient’s administration can play an incentive role. By
comparing the volume of aid donors allocated during electoral years according to the
political alignment of recipient’s administrations, Faye and Niehaus found a reallocation
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of aid from less politically aligned administrations to more aligned administrations during
competitive elections. This result suggested the existence of political aid cycle that may
have adverse or positive effects on institutional quality in aid recipient countries.
The institutional peril that aid engenders is unclear. Askarov and Doucouliagos
(2013) nuanced the negation of the institutional peril of aid that seems to have emerged
as dominant in the recent literature on development aid and governance. Askarov and
Doucouliagos conducted a meta-analysis and suggested that development aid had no or
zero effect on democracy but affects some parts of the word mainly some East European
transitional economies moderately. The impact of development aid on governance was
somewhat positive but depended on the time-period in terms of before and after postCold War. These findings have various implications. They suggest that other factors can
influence the effect of aid on governance and that there were no precise mechanisms on
how development aid affects democracy and governance. The measure of development
aid as well as democracy and governance matter for the research results. Askarov and
Doucouliagos also confirmed that it is possible that development aid positively influences
governance and promotes democracy if appropriately designed. Ravallion (2014) adopted
the same posture from its literature review by arguing that the aid curse seems
theoretically plausible but does not prove empirically. The aid curse appears to be
contingent on various parameters including the social preferences of leaders, which are
not well known, and the qualities of existing institutions. Even in the case of elite capture
and fungibility, government consumption rather than investment can be beneficial to
poor. There was no clear evidence that aid stalls beneficiary efforts to mobilize domestic
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revenues. Neither was there any robust finding that aid harms institutions. Conversely,
with development aid, donors can push for politically costly reforms with long-term
benefits and help to avoid a poor institution trap by forcing countries to a minimum
threshold level. Therefore, it could be counterproductive to withdraw aid in the presence
of corrupt governments. Ravallion also questioned the use of economic growth to enquire
aid effectiveness as most aid targets social objectives. It emerged from these arguments
that there is still room to investigate further many missing links including how the social
preferences and constraints that leaders face affect aid management and its effectiveness.
Ravallion shared this view and called for in-depth investigations of the dynamics of
institutional development to how aid affects institutions and whether it is optimal and
advisable to cut assistance for evil governments.
Budget Support Effectiveness, Policies, and Governance
Budget support is an aid modality donors use to combine financial amount, policy
dialogue between aid donors and recipients, technical assistance and a policy reforms
agenda. In its conception, budget support synthetizes various means that donors have
used sparingly to ensure aid effectiveness. Theoretically, by using budget support, donors
can thus influence governance settings in recipient countries through various mechanisms
to ensure enhanced aid outcomes.
According to the World Bank (2010), which is a pioneer of this aid policy, budget
support should promote country ownership, facilitate alignment of donors to recipients’
development agendas, favor harmonization between donors, and reduce transaction costs.
Researchers studied the extent to which budget support has been successful in meeting
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these general objectives and reached mixed conclusions. Based on a descriptive narrative,
Tavakoly and Smith (2013) highlighted that budget support was effective in improving
allocative efficiency and public finance management, but it did not reduce transaction
costs and did not improve public service delivery. While Tavakoly and Smith did not
define their meaning of allocative efficiency and transaction costs, their findings raised
concerns about the possible efficiency gains that donors could expect from improved
public service delivery. Selaya and Thiele (2012) studied the impact of budget support on
bureaucracy which is one of the means to deliver and improve public service and
explained that the impact of development assistance on bureaucratic quality depends on
the degree of bureaucrat’s discretion in recipient countries. Selaya and Thiele argued that
budget support hurts bureaucracy, as it offers a high degree of discretion to beneficiaries.
While Selaya and Thiele did not clarify the mechanisms behind their suggestion finding,
their result is in contradiction with the principle of country ownership that underlies
budget support policy. As Ohemeng and Grant (2014) noted, If improved bureaucracy
can boost the efficiency of public service delivery, Selaya and Thiele’s finding would
indicate that budget support policy can weaken the efficiency of public service delivery
as it can impair the functioning of bureaucracy.
The source of improved allocative efficiency was also subject of concern, as the
main objective of budget support and therefore the expected policy outcome seems
varying from a donor to another. Swedlund (2013) investigated the country ownership
objective and argued that budget support constituted a channel for donors’ influence on
policymaking in recipient countries. Using a multiple-case study involving Rwanda and

45
Tanzania, Swedlund explained that donors used budget support to influence decision
making in the two studied countries through voice amplification, a seat at the table, and a
license to ask questions. While Swedlund did not prove the generalization of his results,
his findings suggest that through these three channels of influence, donors may enforce
directly sound policies such as those that enhance allocative efficiency, instead of
impelling changes in institutional policy making setting. In this line, Anthunes et al.
(2012) found no evidence of the effect of budget support on health spending. While this
result based on econometric estimation focused on allocation spending to the health
sector, it was useful in highlighting a possible effect of budget support on budget
allocation. An evaluation carried out by the World Bank in 2010 also confirmed the
ambiguousness of the relationship between budget support and policy outcomes,
suggesting an insufficient understanding of the mechanisms that may relate budget
support to policy outcomes.
Donors use budget support as a political instrument, rather than a purely technical
tool for promoting sound policies in recipient countries. Molenaers (2012) contended that
there was a significant divide between donors regarding visions and practical orientations
of budget support. The guidelines developed by the OECD (2012) and the World Bank
(2010) emphasize the technocratic ground and dimension of budget support both
regarding development and governance reforms. However, the budget support practice
revealed that many donors diverted from these standards and tied their budget support to
political conditionalities. These donors therefore still maintained their traditional views
that aid should respond to political objectives such as the promotion of democracies in
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recipient countries. In this context, since political conditionalities were reported to have
ambiguous success in the literature, the actual impact of budget support on governance
reforms such as public service delivery, quality and transparent public budget processes
and cycles, and improved public financial management, is uncertain. Dijkstra (2012) used
a case study based on document reviews and secondary data to analyze the
implementation of budget support regarding pre-conditions, intermediary results, and
policy outcomes. Dijkstra suggested budget support in Nicaragua was characterized a
trade-off donors made between governance and poverty reduction objectives. As a result,
budget support was not successful in generating policy outcomes such as reduced
poverty; nor did it have a significant impact on public governance quality. If this finding
were generalized, it would mean that budget support does not provide enough incentives
for good policymaking that would be necessary to make development assistance useful.
This implication would contradict the rationale that underlies budget support. Hayman
(2011) also explored the democratic governance lens on budget support by investigating
the relationship between budget support and democracy conditionality. Hayman argued
that, while budget support was meant to be technically oriented, it has also been
politically conditioned by donors, although there was little evidence that budget support
was successful in fostering the expected democratic changes in recipient countries.
The idea of investigating the inclusion of political conditionality such as
democracy promotion within budget support framework builds on the relationship
between democratic governance and development. As Biondo and Orbie (2014)
discussed, there is conflicting evidence that democracy promotes development.
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Therefore, it would be illusory to expect that budget support favors development
outcomes through the promotion of democratic governance. This imprecision may
explain the shift of donors, such as the European Commission, from the extreme
democracy promoter to the development promoter while maintaining public governance
incentive tranches. Molenaers, Gagiano, Smets, and Dellepiane (2015) conducted and
econometric analysis and found that donors relied on budget support to sanction
democracy regress. Suspensions of disbursement by donors within the budget support
framework were associated to downward trend in democracy functioning. However, the
study falls short in explaining how democratic governance can influence the relationship
between budget support and development outcomes.
Budget Support Effectiveness and Public Administration
It results from the review of the literature on aid effectiveness and budget support
effectiveness that the first theoretical framework that can inform the assessment of the
relationship between budget support and efficiency of public service delivery is the
institutional analysis and development framework explained by Ostrom, Cox, and
Schlarger (2014). This theory implies that policy process requires a trade-off between
efficiency and other public or democratic values such as accountability and equity.
Within the framework of budget support there are technical and implicit political
conditionalities that require recipients’ countries to meet objectives such as equity or
enhanced accountability through strengthened democratic governance (Molenaers, 2012).
This requirement may force beneficiaries to trade public spending efficiency to meet
imposed objectives. Therefore, this theoretical framework would suggest that budget
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support could result in efficiency losses in public service delivery. This assumption will
confirm to some extent the institutional peril of aid.
However, an examination of the budget support practice through the innovation
and diffusion model theory as it resulted from Okada and Samreth (2012) would result in
objecting the institutional perils of aid and instead suggest the confirmation of the
argument of good governance promotion of development aid. According to Berry and
Berry (2014)., the innovation and diffusion model explains how governments adopt new
programs resulting in non-incremental policy changes. The policy framework that
underlies budget support usually requires states to take new policies or programs or
suspend ongoing programs such as procurement policy or public financial management
policies in line with the disbursement triggers (The European Union, 2012). Such
innovation diffusion may result in efficiency gains at least in the long run even though
the beneficiary government may partially divert the existing resources to formulate and
implement these new policies, to the satisfaction of the donor. If the possible gains in the
medium to long-term compensate the short-run costs resulting from diverting current
policy inputs, the non-incremental policy change budgetary support impelled would
reveal efficient government spending. This corresponds to the disciplinary behavior that
the donor imposes on the aid recipient in Bourguignon and Platteau (2015)’s analytical
framework. In this sense, the benefit from the non-incremental changes that budget
support may imply could depend on both the aid amount and the impact of the policy
change. The policy diffusion theoretical framework is thus useful to examine the extent to
which the conditionality framework of budget support designed to promote sound
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policies result in favorable or unfavorable outcomes regarding efficiency gains or losses
in public service delivery.
The current assessment of budget support also reveals that it is still difficult for
governments in recipient countries to foresee donors’ decisions despite the principle of
improving aid visibility that underlies budget support (Tavakoli & Gregory, 2013). A
donor may decide to withdraw from using budget support modality. A new donor may
choose to engage in budget support. The transaction cost approach as it was described by
Williamson (2014) could elucidate the implications of this dynamics and the
uncoordinated action that the practice of budget support may generate. This
organizational theory depicts the way organizational settings result in transaction costs. It
considers transaction as the unit of analysis to explain how individuals with bounded
rationality working in the organization can only generate incomplete contracts and seek
for transaction cost economizing. As Swedlund (2013) said, budget support leads to an
organizational setting that integrates donors into the policymaking process through voice
amplification, a seat at the table, and a right to ask questions. The interactions that
characterize this blended regulatory environment incorporating both donors and
recipients can result in efficiency losses or gains, mainly due to myopic governance
structures and incomplete contracts induced by bounded rationality and opportunistic
behaviors of donors and recipients. Indeed, recipient governments may demonstrate
unethical conducts and scratch the efficiency of policy inputs that are non-observable to
donors. However, Bourguignon and Platteau (2015) explain that donors have the
possibility through disciplinary measures and the integration of executive cost
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compensation in their aid package to mitigate the recipient’s opportunistic behavior. The
effectiveness of policy making would thus depend on the degree of alignment between
the recipient government’s priorities and the policy requirements by donors within the
blended organizational setting that the practice of budget support generates.
Summary
The review of the literature provides how and the extent to which scholars have
investigated the long-standing issue of aid effectiveness. Various studies have tried to
understand factors that may explain the mixed results of aid in promoting development. A
recent yet insufficient literature has focused on the idea that development aid is useful
when associated with the right policies and institutions. In this sense, some researchers
have examined the specificities of budget support effectiveness. However, most of these
studies fall short to investigate one of the essential mechanisms that can reflect the
promotion of good governance, which is the efficiency of public service delivery or the
public expenditures efficiency.
As Molenaers (2012), and Faust, Leidrer, and Schmitt (2012) noted, donors seem
to emphasize distinctive objectives while designing and implementing budget support.
This makes it difficult to assess the effectiveness of budget support. However, one factor
that may reconcile these diverging interpretations of budget support policy could be the
efficiency of public service delivery. Indeed, regardless of its definitions, budget support
results in transferring financial resources into the recipient’s budget. Therefore,
understanding the way aid recipient countries use these resources and how donors are
successful in influencing government spending will inform the effectiveness of budget
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support policy. The existing literature has not considered explicitly the extent to which
budget support affects the efficiency of public service delivery.
This research will contribute to the research on the effectiveness of budget
support, by assessing the relationship between budget support and public service
delivery. It will build on Cordello and Dell ’Ariccia’s theoretical framework that
illustrates the possibility that foreign aid improves governance setting in recipient
countries. It associates this theory with selected public administration theories to
investigate the extent to which budget support will favor institutional quality through
efficient public expenditures.
Chapter 3 will describe the research methodology. It will include the rationale for
the use of time series cross-sectional design and the specification of the methods for the
analysis of the relationships between budget support and public expenditure efficiency
for WAEMU countries. There will also be a description of the sample population,
procedures, ethical considerations, measures, and an explanation of analysis methods.

52
Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
The purpose of the study was to examine the relationship between aid and
institutional quality in recipient countries by focusing on budget support and government
spending efficiency. Governance and institutions in aid recipients’ nations determine aid
effectiveness (Burnside & Dollar, 2000). Good governments consider efficient public
service delivery that indicates improved allocations of general revenues for increased
public policy outcomes (Hyman, 2013). According to Bourguignon and Platteau (2015),
donors could combine need and public governance quality in aid recipient countries in
their aid allocation objective function with the endogenization of disciplinary measures
imposed on aid recipients to improve aid outcomes. In practice, this may require
identifying and using the appropriate aid modality to influence governance settings in
poor recipient countries. Donors have increasingly been using budget support to affect
governance setting in aid recipient countries. The study will explore the extent to which
budget support is an aid modality improves public service delivery efficiency in
WAEMU countries which have benefited from increasing aid through budget support
since 1990.
This chapter discusses the nature of the study and contains a description of the
research design and methodology. It includes an overview of the rationale for the
selection of the research design, population, type of data, and data procedure. Chapter 3
also includes a description of variables and measurement procedures, an explanation of
analysis methods, and ethical considerations.
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Research Design and Approach
The proposed quasiexperimental design for the study is a Time Series CrossSectional (TSCS) design. This design was used to examine the relationship between
budget support and public governance quality across WAEMU countries and over 19952015 in two steps. The first step was estimation of the dependent variable which is public
governance quality for selected WAEMU countries over 1995-2015. According to
Agenor and Yilmaz (2013), government spending efficiency (GSE) can serve as a
measure of public governance quality. By using SFA procedure I estimated GSE
coefficients for each country over 1995-2015 by means of a panel model in which the
outcome indicator (HDI) was regressed against total public expenditures. During the
second step, panel regressions involving fixed-effects and random-effects models were
used to test the research hypotheses. In these regressions, the estimated GSE coefficients
were related to budget support variables and covariates including macroeconomic
stability, corruption index and development level to examine the relationship between
public governance quality and budget support.
Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2007) explained that TSCS designs could
constitute a good alternative to experimental designs, especially when it is difficult to
define control groups. The cross-sectional dimension of TSCS designs was used to assess
differences in terms of performances of countries with regards to budget support policy,
irrespective of time. The chronological dimension allowed to describe the specificities or
idiosyncrasies of countries in terms of GSE and budget support over time. The two
dimensions of TSCS allows accounting simultaneously for both within-countries
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dynamics over time and inter-countries heterogeneity, which is not possible with only
time series or cross-section data. TSCS also make it possible to consider the influence of
unobservable individual country’s characteristics on governments’ behaviors.
It was not possible to use experimental designs, for two main reasons. First, the
study will cover countries that have already benefited from budget support, and,
therefore, it is not possible to randomly assign nations between experimental and control
groups randomly. Second, a donor’s decision to deliver ODA through budget support is
induced by deliberate policy motives and political agreements between the donor and the
budget support recipient. Therefore, it is not appropriate to assume that donors
discriminate between beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries of budget support randomly or
that they randomly select years where they use budget support to deliver aid.
Population and Procedure

Population
WAEMU governments that benefit from budget support between 1995 and 2015
will constitute the population of the study. The WAEMU is a currency area of eight West
African countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger,
Senegal, and Togo. There is a joint central bank known as Banque Centrale des Etats de
l’Afrique de l’Ouest (BCEAO), which sets standard monetary policy. There is a
WAEMU commission that ensures the implementation of the pact of convergence,
stability, growth, and solidarity which is a political and economic agreement between
member states. This agreement has implications for governments’ expenditure policies
within the union as it constitutes a commitment by member states to abide by specific
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macrofiscal criteria, especially in terms of public finance, inflation, public debt, and
balance of payment. These requirements mean that governments within the union should
avoid t primary public deficit and should maintain inflation below 3%, and public debt
should not surpass 70% of the GDP. Another fiscal criterion was requiring governments
to maintain public payroll below 35% of tax revenues, which should not be less than 17%
of GDP. Another rule requires WAEMU governments to spend not less than 20% of
domestic revenues on public investments.
According to the World Bank (2016), WAEMU countries are low-income
countries (LICs) with an average gross national income per capita of less than $1,025 (as
of the end of 2015). The OECD (2014) stated that such countries are in the most need of
foreign aid. WAEMU governments have therefore been benefiting from ODA consisting
of grants and concessional loans between 1995 and 2015. However, differences in terms
of the amount of aid they receive are supposed to be correlated with institutional quality.
The World Bank, for instance, allocates its concessional resources based on its country
policy and institutional assessment (CPIA) that results in institutional quality rating in
LICs. The CPIA is a composite index of four clusters which are economic management,
social inclusion, public sector management and structural policies. Each cluster is
composed of various sub-components. Each component, as the resulting CPIA average
score, is rated between 1 indicating the lowest performance and 6 indicating the highest
performance. According to Carter (2016), the CPIA is meant to reward country’s
performance regarding the effective use of ODA. The best-performing WAEMU
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countries are expected to benefit from more resources compared the lowest-performing
countries.
Each WAEMU country was observed 21 times between 1995-2015 regarding
each variable. The eight countries were thus observed 21 times meaning the maximum
total number of observations is 168 (8 countries X 21 years). I expect a maximum of five
predictors per regression to maintain an acceptable degree of freedom and statistical
power.
Procedures
The study will use data from the World Bank world development indicator
database, the OECD databank, the United Nations human development database, and the
WAEMU central bank. The World Bank world development indicator database provides
long series of comparable data between countries regarding total public expenditures and
allocations to various economic and social sectors. The Human Development database is
the repository for the HDI and associated indicators, especially selected health and
education outcomes including life expectancy, maternal mortality rates, and primary
school attendance. The OECD computes statistical data regarding ODA, including total
ODA flows per recipient and donors, ODA modality used by donors, ODA per sector.
The WAEMU Central Bank databank includes information on governmental financial
operations including the structure of revenues and expenditures. It also includes data
regarding budget support and total aid amounts WAEMU countries have benefited from.
All these databases are free to access online. The World Bank and United Nations
databases do not require subscriptions to download their data, which is available in
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various formats, including Excel. The OECD database requires a private subscription to
download data. These three databases incorporate appropriate metadata that provides
necessary information to assess the quality and reliability of available data. Also, the
OECD and World Bank have put in place online libraries where one can access various
qualitative information on ODA, budget support and other variables freely.
Measurement
The Dependent Variable: GSE
Government spending efficiency (GSE) is the dependent variable and is at ratio
level. Its measurement will consist of the estimation of efficiency coefficients for the
eight countries for each year. The GSE coefficient indicates the extent to which
governments maximize the available resources to achieve its policy targets. Its estimation
requires relating policy inputs to policy outcome and derives the efficiency ratio.
The policy outcome: HDI. Giving that WAEMU countries are mainly LICs, the
targeted objective of WAEMU governments is to promote development. This policy
outcome reflects the engagement of the international community including WAEMU
countries to the Monterrey declaration on MDGs in 2000. The MDGs consisted of eight
development outcomes that WAEMU governments committed to achieve between 1990
and 2015 regarding extreme poverty, education, gender, child and maternal health, and
environment. An appropriate policy outcome would thus be a synthetic index that
summarizes these key dimensions that represent the primary objectives of public policy
over the indicated period in the WAEMU states. However, the lack of continued MDG
data for all countries limits the possibility of constructing this index.
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Another well-established measure of the level of development is HDI UNDP
publishes each year for most countries in the world. HDI is in line with Sen’s indication
that development should go beyond improving the wealth of the economy in which
individuals live to integrate human wealth (UNDP, 1990). The calculation of HDI
integrates three dimensions: standard of living, education, and health. A sub-index is
calculated for each dimension based on defined variables. The gross national income is
used to calculate the sub-index for the standard of living dimension. The expected and
mean years of schooling are used to calculate the sub-index for the education dimension.
Life expectancy at birth measures the health dimension and is used to calculate the subindex for health. HDI is the geometric mean of the three sub-indexes calculated for the
three dimensions. To ensure comparisons between countries and classification, HDI
integrates an aspect that relates to each of the three dimensions (standard of living,
education, and health), the level a country achieves to the highest level in a given year.
As conceptualized and firstly released in 1990 by the UNDP, the mathematical equation
for the calculation of a sub-index is the following: For a dimension D which maybe
standard of living or education or health, the Sub-Index (SI) is calculated for the country
(i) at a year (t) as follow:
SIit =

Dit −dt
Dt −𝑑t

(1)

Dit is the value taken by the variable measuring the dimension D for the country
(i) at a year (t). For instance, Dit could be the value of GNI for Benin in 2005 or the value
of life expectancy at birth for Senegal in 1998. Dt and dt are respectively the highest and
lowest values of the variable measuring the dimension D at the year (t).
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This calculation can under or overestimate the self-dynamics in delivering policy
outcomes in countries. The resulting government efficiency can thus hide the actual
efficiency dynamics in countries. Following improvement on the measurement of human
development, a modification of the index was performed by removing the yearly relative
dimension. In the following equation, the self-dynamics at country level is captured by
using the maximum (D) and minimum (d) values for all countries for the whole period
reviewed:
SIit =

Dit −d
D−d

(2)

The resulting policy outcome index provides scores for each country and each
year. By relating this policy outcome composite index to government expenditure, it is
possible to estimate efficiency coefficients.
The policy input variables. Government total expenditure (GTE) is the primary
explanatory variable to estimate the efficiency coefficient. It comprises all spending a
government disburses during a year except the debt service amount. The latter does not
benefit directly to a development sector such as health or education but consists of
payments of amortizations of loans the government contracts. Since the government
would have used the debt amount for public service delivery, including their
reimbursement in the total expenditure will count double for delivering public service and
will introduce bias in the resulting government spending efficiency. For the estimation of
the efficiency coefficient, the measurement of the total expenditure will be in the
proportion of the gross domestic product (GDP).
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The estimation of the efficiency coefficient will also include the following
covariates: population size, population density, level of development and the overall
education level in the country (Ivohasina & Razafimahefa, 2015). The population size is
the number of inhabitants in each of the WAEMU countries each year. Population density
is the number of inhabitants per square km in each state at a given time. A low population
density regionally can affect the level of efficiency in delivering public services. For
instance, the distance separating villages may require the government to establish more
health care centers or classrooms to guarantee access to all individuals. The real gross
domestic product per capita is a proxy of the level of development to account for
technological progress that can introduce heterogeneity in countries and their efficiency
performance. The level of education is the average schooling years in each state. A more
educated population can hold the government accountable to their spending and thus
oblige efficiency. Also, a more educated population is a proxy for the quality of human
capital that public bureaucracy uses to produce development outcomes. The World Bank
world development indicator database includes series of these indicators. Also, the
United Nations Development Programme, on its human development index website,
provides information on the average years of schooling and other social indicators for
most countries in the world.
Procedure for measuring efficiency coefficients. The measurement of
efficiency can be dated back to Farrell (1957). Farrell introduced the notion of technical
and allocative efficiencies to distinguish two sub-optimal decisions a producer can make.
Technical inefficiency corresponds to a situation whereby the producer uses an excessive
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amount of input to reach a given level of production. In other words, the same quantity of
output could have been obtained by spending much less in factors of production.
Allocative inefficiency corresponds to a sub-optimal combination of factors given their
price and marginal productivities.
This study focuses on technical efficiency. The government uses its available
resources to produce public goods or deliver public services such as in the health and
education sectors. By assimilating this governmental function to a private producer, the
way in which the government spends its revenues to generate human development (HDI)
is analyzed regarding efficiency.
There are two main methodologies in the literature one can use to calculate
efficiency: non-parametric and parametric methods (Ivohasina & Razafimahefa, 2015).
The data envelopment analysis (DEA) is the non-parametric method researchers use
intensively in the literature to determine the optimum point at which the maximum output
is obtained, given the inputs available. It is appropriate in a context of data limitation,
constraining to the use of cross-sectional dataset. With the view to make the best use of
the longitudinal data available for the WAEMU countries, this study will rather rely on
the parametric-based Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), which consists of estimating a
production function by assuming that there is an ideal HDI no government can exceed.
Governments who deliver at or close to this ideal level are efficient whereas the deviation
in a country’s HDI from the ideal HDI is the measure of the efficiency of this
government. The model used in the present study is based on the assumption that the
state, which is assimilated to a producer, may be mistaken in the allocation of resources
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available for the production of public goods and services to improve human development.
This model was inspired by the existing works of efficient stochastic frontier estimations,
notably those of Aigner, Lovell, Schmidt (1977), Meeusen and Van Den Broeck (1977),
Kumbhakar (1987) and Greene (2005). The government production function can be
written as follows:
𝑄 = 𝑓(𝑥, 𝛽)𝑒 𝑢

u≤0

(3)

With Q, the production, f, the technology function, x, the vector of inputs, β the
parameters of the production function to be estimated, and u, the coefficient of technical
inefficiency. The negative values of u correspond to production levels below the
maximum possible.
In log-linear, Government’s production, which is the delivery of HDI, is as
follows:
𝑙𝑛𝑄 = ln 𝑓(𝑥, 𝛽) + 𝑢 + 𝑣

(4)

Where: Q is production, x are the input factors, 𝛽 the parameters, v is random
error/statistical noise and u is inefficiency.
The behavior of the State is assimilated to that of a rational producer who
minimizes its costs according to the following program:
𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∑ 𝑤𝑥𝑒 𝑢 𝑠𝑐 𝑄 = 𝑓(𝑥, 𝛽)𝑒 𝑢

(5)

w: the price of the inputs vector
The output of the state in each sector is estimated using panel data methodology,
following the nonlinear and iterative Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) procedure.
The eight WAEMU countries will constitute the individual dimension of the panel. The
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technical inefficiency coefficients or the distance separating the State HDI from the
optimal HDI are obtained from the fixed or random effects resulting from the estimation
on panel data. The production function to be estimated is therefore written as follows:
𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖 = ln 𝑓(𝑥𝑖 , 𝛽) + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖

(6)

i represents the individual country.
Following Ivohasina and Razafimahefa (2015), and given the use of long panel
data, the efficiency will be time-varying in such a way that: 𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝑔(𝑡). 𝑢𝑖 and 𝑔(𝑡) =
𝑒 −𝜆(𝑡−𝑇𝑖 ) . It is possible with this approach to consider variables other than government
expenditures. Structural factors in addition to public expenditure, such as socio-economic
characteristics of the country, can also affect the efficiency of public service delivery in
each State.
The measurement of efficiency coefficients will rely on two different estimations
to check the robustness of the estimates. The first two estimates will follow two
measurement methods Battese and Coelli (1988) and Jondrow, Lovell, Materov, and
Schmidt, (1982) suggested. A third estimate may consist of considering heterogeneity
and heteroscedasticity in the estimates. A high correlation between these estimates will
provide me with a significant level of confidence in robust efficiency coefficient
estimates.
The Independent Variable: Budget Support
Budget support policy is the key independent variable for the study. Various
measures serve to specify the budget support policy regarding the hypotheses to be tested.
The first indicator is the total amount of budget support (GTB). It represents the amount
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of foreign aid a country receives through the budget support modality. Based on the
WAEMU central bank data, this amount exists in CFA, the common currency of the
union. The second measure is the proportion of budget support (GPB). It is the ratio
between the amount a country receives through budget support and the total aid that goes
into the state. This variable is to reflect the contribution of budget support to the aid-led
relationship between the WAEMU counties as aid receivers and the aid providers. The
third measure is the proportion of total government spending that budget support
represents (GBS). It consists of dividing the amount of budget support in CFA by the
total government revenue in CFA. A contribution of budget support to improve
Government spending efficacy should reflect a positive correlation between GPB and
efficiency coefficient on the one side, and between GBS and efficiency, on the other side.
Also, a category level variable (BSP) will distinguish a year a country benefits
from budget support from a year it does not. This dichotomy indicator consists of a
transformation of the panel dataset of countries and years into a cross-sectional database
where only the benefice or not of budget support matters, irrespective of the state that
benefits from this assistance and the year it benefits. Indeed, the TSCS involves multiple
data sets. One is panel data set (country x time) and another is cross-sectional data set.
The panel data set considers for each year, the situation of each country regarding
benefiting or not budget support over 1995-2015. The cross-section data set does not
differentiate country and year one by one. It rather considers binomial data points (1 or 0)
that reflect the benefice or not of budget by any country over 1995-2015.
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The Covariates
Based on existing studies such as Adam, Delis, and Kammas (2014) and
Ivohasina and Razafimahefa (2015), control variables that may influence public service
efficiency are level of democracy, level of corruption and macroeconomic stability. A
measure of level of democracy is the high-level index which the Varieties of Democracy
Institute has recently computed (Mechkova and Sigman, 2016). This indicator captures
the multidimensional nature of democracy by considering seven high-level principles of
democracy including electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, egalitarian,
majoritarian and consensual. While it seems difficult to establish a robust relationship
between democratic governance and development, one may expect enhanced social
accountability requirement in a democratic setting. Therefore, governments in advanced
democratic settings could be more accountable to efficient public service delivery.
However, since other democratic values such as equity or equality may force states to a
trade-off, it is not clear how the level of democracy can affect the relationship between
budget support and efficient public service delivery.
There is a measure of corruption that International Transparency-an international
non-governmental organization-computes yearly since 1995. Corruption Perception Index
(CPI) is a composite index from the opinions by various stakeholders such as
businesspeoples and country experts (Transparency International, 2016). The index
ranges from zero, meaning the worst situation, to 100, the less corrupted state. A high
level of corruption would indicate a high propensity of government officers to embezzle
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public resources. This embezzlement would result in inefficient public service delivery as
the actual unit cost would be high for a given outcome level.
A proxy of macroeconomic stability is the variability in the consumer price index
(Skorobogatova, 2016). An unstable macroeconomic framework can negatively affect
government’s decisions regarding technical efficiency. This imprecision in decision
making could result in an overutilization of inputs (resources) through inappropriate
discretionary choices or artificial increases in unit costs which could generate efficiency
losses. It is also well established in the literature that macroeconomic instability can be
detrimental to economic growth (Skorobogatova, 2016). Since this later is a component
of human development, one could expect that the level of stability influences the
relationship between budget support and efficient public service delivery measured by the
human development index efficiency coefficient.
Data Analysis
The analysis will be in line with the time series cross-sectional design using panel
regressions. The secondary data collected from various sources will be organized in a
single Excel file. For each variable, a table recording country (line) and year (column)
will be developed. This data treatment will allow deriving descriptive statistics to show
mean and standard deviation. Trends in the evolution of key variables (budget support
and human development index) will help analyze stylized facts that may be considered in
conducting regressions and discussions.
STATA 15 will serve for various panel regressions including the estimation of
efficiency coefficients. The first research question is Research Question #1. To what
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extent does the use of budget support in WAEMU countries measured by a dummy
variable of 1 (the country benefits budget support) or 0 (the country does not benefit)
predict the quality of their public governance, measured by their public expenditure
efficiency over time? This question is to investigate the extent to which efficiency
coefficients vary about the benefice of budget support or not. The related null hypothesis
is the following: H01: There is no relationship between the use of budget support in
WAEMU countries over time and the quality of public governance, measured by the
efficiency of public expenditures. The alternative hypothesis is Ha1: There is a positive
relationship between the use of budget support in WAEMU countries over time and the
quality of public governance, measured by the efficiency of public expenditures. I expect
a positive correlation between the number of times a country benefits from budget
support and the quality of its public service delivery measured by the efficiency of public
expenditures in WAEMU countries. This hypothesis will be tested by relating the
category variable of budget support (BSP) that describes the benefice or not of budget
support to the efficiency coefficients. A country benefits budget support (dummy is 1)
when the county’s budget indicates received ODA through budget support aid modality
in the considered year. When there is no ODA indicated in the country’s budget for the
given year, the country is considered to not be engaged in budget support with aid
providers (dummy is 0). The significance (or not) of the dummy will indicate whether
there is a significant difference between the mean efficiency coefficient both in times and
between countries. When this factor is significant, its sign will show the nature of the
relationship between budget support and the use of budget support aid modality.
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The second research question is: To what extent does the amount of development
aid WAEMU countries receive over time through budget support predicts the quality of
public governance, measured by the efficiency of public expenditures? The second null
hypothesis is H02: There is no relationship between the absolute amount of budget
support WAEMU governments receive and the quality of their public service delivery,
measured by the efficiency of public expenditures over time. The second alternative
hypothesis is Ha2: There is a relationship between the absolute amount of budget support
WAEMU governments receive and the quality of their public service delivery, measured
by the efficiency of public expenditures over time. I expect there is no significant
relationship between the absolute amount of budget support a government received and
its spending efficiency for WAEMU countries. The hypothesis is tested by regressing
GSE coefficients for the eight WAEMU countries against budget support amount for the
eight countries over 1995-2015.
The third research question is: To what extent does the proportion of budget
support amount in total aid in WAEMU countries predicts the quality of public
governance, measured by the efficiency of public expenditures? The third null hypothesis
is H03: there is no relationship over time between the proportion of budget support
amount in total aid in WAEMU countries and the quality of their public service delivery,
measured by the efficiency of public expenditures. The third alternative hypothesis is
Ha3: There is a relationship over time between the proportion of budget support amount
in total aid in WAEMU countries and the quality of their public service delivery,
measured by the efficiency of public expenditures. I expect there is a positive relationship
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between the proportion of budget support in total aid and public budget efficiency for
WAEMU countries. This hypothesis is tested by regressing GSE coefficients for the eight
WAEMU countries against the ratio budget support to total aid received.
The fourth research question is: To what extent does the share of budget support
amount in total government revenue in WAEMU countries predicts the quality of public
governance, measured by the efficiency of public expenditures? The fourth null
hypothesis is H04: There is no relationship over time between the share of budget support
amount in total government revenue in WAEMU countries and the quality of their public
service delivery, measured by the efficiency of public expenditures. The fourth
alternative hypothesis is Ha4: There is a relationship over time between the share of
budget support amount in total government revenue in WAEMU countries and the quality
of their public service delivery, measured by the efficiency of public expenditures. I
expect there is a positive relationship between the share of budget support amount in total
government revenue and public expenditure efficiency in WAEMU countries. This
hypothesis is tested by regressing GSE coefficients for the eight WAEMU countries
against the ratio of budget support to total government revenues.
The fifth research question is: To what extent does the initial level of institutional
quality affect the prediction of the quality of public governance by the amount of budget
support in WAEMU countries over time? The associated null is H05: The initial level of
governance does not affect the relationship between the amount of budget support and the
efficiency of public expenditure for WAEMU countries over time. The alternative
hypothesis is Ha5: The initial level of governance affects the relationship between the

70
amount of budget support and the efficiency of public expenditure for WAEMU countries
over time. I expect that the initial level of governance moderates the relationship between
budget support variables and the efficiency of public expenditure for WAEMU countries.
To test this hypothesis, the same four panel regressors of the first four research questions
will be re-estimated with the introduction of the GSE coefficient lag to test the influence
of the initial level of governance. Also, for validity check, the lagged GSE coefficient
will be replaced by the Government Effectiveness Index computed by the World Bank.
The sixth research question is: To what extent does the political context affect the
prediction of the quality of public governance, measured by the efficiency of public
expenditures, by budget support in WAEMU countries over time? The related null
hypothesis is H06: The political context measured by the level of democratization does
not affect the relationship between budget support and public expenditure efficiency in
WAEMU countries. The alternative hypothesis is Ha6: The political context measured by
the level of democratization affect the relationship between budget support and public
expenditure efficiency in WAEMU countries. I expect that the political context measured
by the level of democratization significantly influences the relationship between budget
support and public expenditure efficiency in WAEMU countries. To test this hypothesis,
panel regressor is estimated by introducing democracy index in previous panel
regressions of the first four research questions. An interaction variable of democracy
index budget support variables was also introduced in panel regressions in addition to the
democracy index. For validity check, democracy index will be replaced by political
stability index using the same panel regressions.
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Threats to Validity
As O’Sullivan, Rassel and Berner (2008) advised, I will conduct an assessment of
secondary data regarding coding, measurement, and reliability. The consultation of the
available metadata to the data collected online will inform selection and adequate data
treatments. By using triangulation, the data source that minimizes bias in data will be
chosen. Despite the traditional definition of development aid, organizations tend to tailor
definitions and conceptualizations based on their aid practices. This adaptation may affect
the comparability of data computed and made available by aid providers. The comparison
of data donors made available with the aid data available at country levels will be
undertaken to analyze potential bias regarding data aid data comparability. The WAEMU
Central Bank calculates and treats national public budget data which also include aid and
budget support data. As the unique central bank for the 8 countries, BCEAO produced
comparable public budget data using a unique methodology to adjust country data.
To test the validity of results, I will use various panel regressors. As already
underlined for the GSE coefficient estimates, two different measures will be used. For the
analysis of the relationship between budget support and public service efficiency, the
fixed effect model is appropriate. This model assumes homogeneity of the coefficients.
Constants as the only sources of heterogeneity are deterministic (i.e., non-random) and
differ according to countries and years. However, to test the validity of findings, the
random-effects model will be considered as the alternative panel model. Fixed effects
models may be biased due to failure to control individual effects. Studying individual
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effects, where they exist, improves the accuracy of the estimates and ensures a correct
evaluation of the variance of the estimated coefficients.
To ensure the validity of panel data regressors, I will examine the homogeneous or
heterogeneous specification of the data generating process. Econometrically, this is
equivalent to testing differences in country coefficients of the explanatory variables.
Economically, the model specification tests allow assume that the theoretical model
studied is perfectly identical for all countries, or that there are idiosyncrasies to each
country. These procedures will test whether a fixed-effect versus a random-effects model
has a better fit to the data.
The first test to be conducted is Fisher’s test or Likelihood Ratio Test which is to
test the hypotheses H0: Absence of fixed effects versus Ha: Presence of fixed effects
following the estimation of the fixed effects model. The test results in the Fischer statistic
and supports the hypothesis H0 of the presence of fixed effects when the statistic is
greater than the critical value read on the Fisher table.
The second test is that of Breusch and Pagan (1979) used to test the hypotheses H0:
Absence of random effects versus Ha: Presence of random effects after estimating the
random effect model. The Breusch and Pagan statistic is computed. The test supports the
presence of random effects if the probability of the Breusch-Pagan statistic is below the
critical threshold (5% or .05).
The analysis of the model specification is concluded by the Hausman (1978)’s test.
It consists of discriminating between fixed effects and random effects and thus decide on
the appropriate model to use for the analysis. This test is based on the following
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hypotheses: Ho: Presence of random effects (model with random effects) versus Ha. The
test supports the presence of fixed effects (model with fixed effects) if the probability of
the statistic (Prob> chi2) is below the critical threshold (5%). In this case, the fixed
effects model is appropriate to conduct the analysis.
Ethical Considerations
There are limited ethical issues and risks for this study, because of the following
reasons. The study does not cover or interact with living persons. The population of the
research will consist of states and aggregated data at country level. Since secondary data
are publicly available there is minimal risk of collecting and divulging personal or
country data without consent. Likewise, there will be no physical engagement with
government officials that may cause unwanted intrusion, disturbance, abuse,
unpleasantness, or generate risks on their careers. Furthermore, since data are freely
accessible online, the issue of confidentiality in terms of whether a state wants to
disseminate data or not is also mitigated, because the concerned data are already made
available with states’ consent. Finally, although I am working for a development agency,
this agency is not engaged in budget support. Therefore, ethical issues and risks related to
researchers working in their organization are minimal. My professional setting has no
direct implication on analyses and discussions although I am working on development
assistance.
Summary
The study will use time series cross-sectional design to assess the relationship
between public service delivery efficiency and budget support in the WAEMU countries.
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Panel data will be constituted with eight WAEMU countries over 1995-2015. The
dependent variable will be measured by GSE coefficients that will result from an SFA
with a regression of HDI over total public expenditures and other covariates such as
population size, population density, and level of development. The estimated GSE
coefficients will be further related to different budget support variables and covariates to
test null and alternative hypotheses that underlie the six research questions. The selected
software to run panel regressions is STATA. There will also be robustness tests with the
use of alternative variables and models. The study will use secondary data that are openly
accessible through various databases, without prior permission. There are therefore no
fundamental ethical issues.
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Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
The purpose of the current study was to quantitatively examine whether there is a
relationship between budget support as an aid modality and public spending efficiency in
WAEMU countries. The assessment consists of testing six directional and exploratory
research questions using a TSCS for the eight WAEMU countries which have benefited
from budget support between 1995 and 2015. This chapter provides a description of the
variables in this study and summarizes the results of analyses.
Selected Descriptive Statistics of Variables
The two tables below define and describe the variables used for the analyses in
this study. Table 1 includes a list of variables, their definitions, and sources of data
related to each of the variables. Selected descriptive statistics including mean, P50,
minimum, maximum and variance appear in Table 2.
Table 1
Labelling Variables and Sources of Data
Label
HDI
GOV_REV
GOV_DEP
GOV_INT
GOV_NET
ODA_TOT
BSP
BSP DUM
GDP
GOV_gdp

Variables
Human Development Index
Total Government Revenues
Total public expenditures
Debt service
Total expenditures except debt services
Total ODA
Total Budget Support
Dummy Budget support
Gross Domestic Product
Ratio of total expenditures to GDP

Sources
UNDP-HDI website
WAEMU Central Bank
WAEMU Central Bank
WAEMU Central Bank
WAEMU Central Bank
WAEMU Central Bank
WAEMU Central Bank
Calculation by the Author
WAEMU Central Bank
Calculation by the Author
(table continues)
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GOV_net_gdp
BSP_gdp
BSP_rev
BSP_oda
POL1
MACRO_S
POP_S
POP_D
EDUC2
EDUC
CORR
POL2
GOV_EFF

Ratio of expenditure except debt service to
GDP
Ratio of budget support to GDP
Ratio of Budget support to Revenue
Ratio of Budget support to ODA
Democracy index
Macroeconomic stability (CPI)
Population size
Population density
Expected years of schooling
Mean school years
Corruption Perception index
Political stability index
Government effectiveness

Calculation by the Author
Calculation by the Author
Calculation by the Author
Calculation by the Author
Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem)
WAEMU Central Bank
UN Population Division
UN Population Division
UNDP-HDI website
UNDP-HDI website
Transparency International
Global Economy.com
Comstat

Table 2
Statistical Summary of the Data of the Eight WAEMU Countries
Variable
hdi
gov_rev
gov_dep
gov_int
gov_net
oda_tot
bsp
bspdum
gdp
govgdp
bspgdp
gov_net_gdp
bspgov_rev
bspoda_tot
pol
macro_s
pop_s

Mean
.3817537
690.1086
771.1043
54.86322
716.2411
102.9134
39.68528
.6875
3517.543
.1961515
.0163505
.1961515
.0743217
.2647833
.3185972
94.75335
10618.93

P50
.3945
462.15
519.75
20.92712
502.8139
72.56775
14.6
1
2452.745
.1911492
.0067718
.1911492
.0359076
.2470309
.3324382
92.651
10619.84

Sd
.0657405
667.9214
750.2147
78.26362
698.5328
130.021
110.5828
.4648348
3342.179
.0430931
.041784
.0430931
.1081504
.2366361
.0859002
21.0855
5460.881

Variance
.0043218
446119.1
562822.1
6125.194
487948
16905.46
12228.56
.2160714
1.12e+07
.001857
.0017459
.001857
.0116965
.0559966
.0073788
444.5985
2.98e+07

Min

Max

.226
.494
9.638
3904.847
30.3
4457.505
.1
348.3
22
4160
3.5
1244.5
0
1169
0
1
118.329
19362.59
.0992596
.3529226
0
.4210636
.0992596
.3529226
0
.7007331
0
1
.1270253
.4736821
21.084
147.554
1113.541
23108.47
(table continues)
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pop_d
educ
educ2
corr

49.30335
2.460131
6.790341
28.9619

49.14808
2.4
6.8
29

29.68105
1.072892
2.422294
5.822575

880.965
1.151097
5.867506
33.90238

7.223175
.8
.4
17

130.612
4.8
12
44

Estimation of GSE Coefficients
The efficiency coefficients of public expenditure were estimated using SFA. The
parameters of the stochastic frontier model and those of technical inefficiency are
simultaneously estimated using the maximum likelihood method. These are the
parameters of the variance of the likelihood function in terms of 𝜎 2 = 𝜎𝜇2 + 𝜎𝜈2 and γ=
𝜎𝜇2 / 𝜎 2 . These parameters are analyzed according to their sign and magnitude. The
parameter γ is the most important in terms of the specification and validation of the
stochastic frontier model. It measures the share of the contribution to the error due to
technical inefficiency in the total variability of the output and thus orients the decision on
the existence of the technical inefficiency.
Battese and Coelli (1988) used a time-invariant model in which any unobserved
heterogeneity is constant over time and is considered as inefficiency. Battese and Coelli’s
concern was how to separate the two components which are static error and error
representing technical inefficiency. The static error follows its standard distribution. The
technical inefficiency error is assumed independent and distributed according to a
normal-truncated conditional distribution to zero with mean 𝜇𝑖 and
variance 𝜎𝜇2 (N(𝜇𝑖 , 𝜎𝜇2 )). According to Jondrow et al. (1982), the static error can follow
either an exponential or semi-normal distribution.
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The implementation of Bettese and Coelli and Jondrow et al’s models consisted
of regressing HDI variable labeled hdi over GTE except debt services labeled gov_net
and controlling for covariates including gross domestic product (gdp), population size
(pop_s), population density (pop_d) and macroeconomic stability (macro_s). The
variables gdp, pop-s, and pop_d were not significant and were subsequently removed
from the model. Table 3 and Table 4 include results of estimates of parameters of the
stochastic frontier model and those of technical inefficiency for the two models.
Table 3
Parameters of Stochastic Frontier and Technical Inefficiency Using Jondrow et al’s
Model
Variable/parameter

B

z

P>IzI

Gov-net

.0000458

11.69

0.000

Macro_s

.0009766

9.03

0.000

sigma_u 𝜎𝜇

.0270666

10.00

0.000

sigma_v 𝜎𝜈

.0072273

3.83

0.000

Frontier

Note. Log likelihood = 469.8317; Prob > chi2= 0.000; Wald chi2 = 713.30
sigma_u 𝜎𝜇 is the parameter for inefficiency and sigma_v 𝜎𝜈 is the parameter for error.
From Table 3, gamma (γ) = 𝜎𝜇2 / 𝜎 2 = 93.34460298% is the contribution of inefficiency to
total output variability.
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Table 4
Parameters of Stochastic Frontier and Technical Inefficiency Using Bettese and Coelli’s
Model
Variable/parameter

B

z

P>IzI

Gov-net

.0000532

16.44

0.000

Macro_s

.0008997

11.56

0.000

sigma_u 𝜎𝜇

.6510519

0.75

0.454

sigma_v 𝜎𝜈

.006315

4.89

0.000

Frontier

Note. gamma (γ) = 𝜎𝜇2 / 𝜎 2 = 99.99059249% is contribution of inefficiency to total output
variability.
Estimates show that a significant share of total output variability (HDI) is due to
technical inefficiency in the eight WAEMU countries over the period 1995-2015. The
contribution of inefficiency to total output variability labeled gamma (γ) is 93% for
Jondrow et al’s smodel and and 99% for Battese and Coelli’s model. However, the
technical inefficiency parameter is not statistically significant in the Bettese and Coelli’s
model. Since the two models generate statistically comparable results, the estimates from
Jondrow et al’s model. will underlie the remaining analyses as well as testing hypotheses.
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Figure 1. Graphic relationship between estimates from the two models per country.
The gamma (γ) value estimates an average efficiency of 12.5% and 87.5% of
technical inefficiency based on Jondrow et al.’s model. In comparison, the average
estimate efficiency was 12.3% against 87.7 inefficiencies with Battese and Coelli’s
model. The efficiency coefficient varies between 2.2% and 33.3% for Jondrow et al. and
between 2.1% and 35.4% for the Battese and Coelli model. The composite nature of the
dependent variable can partly explain the high levels of technical inefficiency. As a
result, this variable tends to aggregate the inefficiencies associated with each of its three
main components: gross domestic product, education, and health.
Table 5
Descriptive Statistics of Efficiency Coefficients for Each Country Using the Two Models
Country
Bénin

Variable

mean

p50

variance

sd

min

max

eff_jn82_hn .1080005 .1026727 .0298953 .0008937 .0594554
eff_bc88_tn .1048035 .0992227 .0306892 .0009418 .056013

.1655579
.1659587

eff_jn82_hn .119567 .1106343 .0342602 .0011738 .0708788
eff_bc88_tn .1182697 .1084087 .0365507 .001336 .0676454

.1790362
.1828544

Burkina-Faso

(table continues)
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Cote d'Ivoire
eff_jn82_hn .1958093 .1812254 .0603498 .0036421 .1100449
eff_bc88_tn .2004652 .1836504 .0653243 .0042673 .1104342

.3344572
.3541899

eff_jn82_hn .0834685 .0849391 .0243475 .0005928 .0220481
eff_bc88_tn .0775948 .0788027 .0226835 .0005145 .0206643

.1113187
.1039918

eff_jn82_hn .1464735 .136689 .0352777 .0012445 .0920885
eff_bc88_tn .1431185 .1331385 .0368051 .0013546 .0875079

.21416
.2149935

eff_jn82_hn .1094819 .0994483 .0314354 .0009882 .067772
eff_bc88_tn .1063783 .09524 .0334808 .001121 .0640445

.1707291
.1732352

eff_jn82_hn .1393228 .1302793 .0398682 .0015895 .0835202
eff_bc88_tn .1409723 .1311604 .0438289 .001921 .0807232

.2026351
.2112545

Guinea Bissau

Mali

Niger

Sénégal

Togo
eff_jn82_hn .1003507 .0924467 .0234055 .0005478
eff_bc88_tn .095378 .0871374 .0233787 .0005466
Average eff_jn82_hn .1253093 .1137091 .0485614 .0023582
eff_bc88_tn .1233725 .110612 .0521568 .0027203

.0632222
.0594156
.0220481
.0206643

.1408346
.1363958
.3344572
.3541899

RQ1: Relationship between GSE and Budget Support
The first research question was about whether there is a positive relationship
between the use of budget support in WAEMU countries over time and the quality of
public governance, measured by the efficiency of public expenditures. The regression of
the GSE coefficients of the eight countries over the dummy variable of benefiting or not
budget support during the study period is significant for both the fixed-effect model F(3,
94) = 251.77, p <.000 and random-effects model Wald chi2(3) = 775.315, p< 0.000.
Tables 6 and 7 present the results of the estimates. The likelihood ratio test (Fisher test)
revealed the presence of fixed-effects, F (7, 94) = 57.77, p< .0000. The Breusch-Pagan
Lagrange multiplier test purported the existence of random effects, chibar2(01) = 444.21,
p <.0000. The Hausmann’s specification test confirmed the presence of random effects,
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chi2(3) = 0.50, p = .9193. The random-effects model is thus appropriate to test the
relationship between the benefice or not of budget support by WAEMU countries and
their public expenditure efficiency.
Table 6
Fixed-effects Regression Analysis Predicting Public Spending Efficiency from Budget
Support with Covariates
Β

SE

t

p

Budget support dummy

.0171

.0051

3.34

.001

Macroeconomic stability

.0023

.000

19.81

.000

Corruption

.0012

.000

3.87

.000

Variable

Note. F (3,94) = 251.77, p < .0000, R² = .6756
Table 7
Random Effects Regression Analysis Predicting Public Spending Efficiency from Budget
Support with Covariates
Β

SE

z

p

Budget support dummy

.0165

.00497

3.32

.001

Macroeconomic stability

.0023

.0001

20.38

.000

Corruption

.0012

.0003

4.04

.000

Variable

Note. Wald chi2 (3) = 775.15, p < .0000, R² = .6756
The random effects model provides the best estimates as it informs on the
independence of the specific effects with the explanatory variables. It also indicates that
technical efficiency incorporates significant idiosyncrasies across countries. This model
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is the most suitable for explaining technical efficiency by the budget support dummy
variable as well as the covariates of macroeconomic stability and level of corruption.
In the random-effects regression, budget support dummy, β = .0165, z = 3.32, p <
.0001 was significant. The Beta coefficient (.0165) indicates that there is a positive
relationship between the efficiency of government spending and the benefit dummy of
budget support. Countries that benefited budget support in a year also experienced a
positive change in public expenditure efficiency. Macroeconomic stability β = - .0023, z
= 20.38, p < .0000 and the level of corruption, β = - .0012, z = 4.04, p < .0000 were also
significant. They positively predict public expenditure efficiency. Countries with a high
level of inflation (high instability) or corruption tend to react positively to the
improvement of government efficiency with the benefice of budget support. These
findings supported the hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between the use of
budget support in WAEMU countries over time and the quality of public governance,
measured by the efficiency of public expenditures.
RQ2: Relationship between GSE and Budget Support Amount
RQ2 was about whether there is a significant relationship between the absolute
amount of budget support WAEMU governments receive and the quality of their public
service delivery, measured by the efficiency of public expenditures over time. The test of
the expected directional hypothesis consisted of regressing the GSE coefficients over the
ratio of budget support amount the recipient country benefited.
Tables 8 and 9 show results of fixed-effect and random-effect regression tests.
Budget support amount was not significant in either of the fixed effect (β = 0.000, p <
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.000) and random effect (β = .00305, z = 1.27, p = .206) models. The likelihood ratio test
(Fisher test) revealed the presence of fixed-effects, F (7, 94) = 51.11, p< .0000. The
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test indicated the existence of random effects,
chibar2(01) = 445.28, p <.0000. The Hausmann’s specification test confirmed the
presence of random effects, chi2(3) = 0.54, p = .91. The random-effects model provided
the best estimates and was the most suitable for explaining technical efficiency by the
budget support amount as well as the covariates of macroeconomic stability and level of
corruption. The budget support amount did not predict government spending efficiency.
These results supported the hypothesis that there is no relationship between the absolute
amount of budget support WAEMU governments receive and the quality of their public
service delivery, measured by the efficiency of public expenditures over time.
Table 8
Fixed-Effects Regression Analysis Predicting Public Spending Efficiency from Budget
Support Amount with Covariates
β

SE

t

p

Budget support amount

0.000

0.000

1.00

.000

Macroeconomic stability

31.000

24.000

291.0

200.00

Corruption

0.000

0.000

3.00

.000

Variable
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Table 9
Random Effects Regression Analysis Predicting Public Spending Efficiency from Budget
Support with Covariates
β

SE

z

p

Budget support amount

.0305

.0241

1.27

.206

Macroeconomic stability

.0024

.0001

22.19

.000

Corruption

.0013

.00003

4.03

.000

Variable

RQ3: Relationship between GSE and Proportion of Budget Support Amount in
Total Aid
If the absolute amount of budget support did not predict public expenditure
efficiency, its weight in total aid a country receives could be a possible determinant. RQ3
was about whether there was a positive relationship over time between the proportion of
budget support amount in total aid in WAEMU countries and the quality of their public
service delivery, measured by the efficiency of public expenditures. The test of the
expected directional hypothesis associated to RQ3 consisted of regressing the efficiency
coefficients over the proportion of the budget support amount in total ODA of the
recipient country. Tables 10 and 11 show the results of the regressions.
The regression results are significant for both the fixed-effect model F (3, 94) =
250.52, p <.000 and random-effects model Wald chi2(3) = 766.41, p< 0.000. The
likelihood ratio test (Fisher test) revealed the presence of fixed-effects, F (7, 94) = 55.80,
p< .0000. The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test indicated the existence of random
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effects, chibar2(01) = 374.27, p <.0000. The Hausmann’s specification test confirmed
the presence of fixed effects, chi2(3) = .88, p = .8298.
The fixed-effects model provided the best estimates and was the most suitable for
explaining technical efficiency by the proportion of budget support amount in total aid
variable as well as the covariates of macroeconomic stability and level of corruption.
Budget support as share of total aid, β = .0228, t = 3.27, p = .002 was significant. The
Beta coefficient (.0228) indicates that there is a positive relationship between the
efficiency of government spending and the proportion of budget support in total aid. The
higher the volume of budget support a government receives in the proportion of total aid,
the higher its spending efficiency. The effect is higher than in the case of budget support
dummy (benefiting or not budget support irrelevance to the amount). The covariates
factors macroeconomic stability β = - .0023, t = 20.42, p < .0000 and the level of
corruption, β = - .0014, t = 4.37, p < .0000 were also significant. These results suggest
that budget support, contingent to its share in total aid, can generate efficiency gains. The
results supported the hypothesis that there is a relationship over time between the
proportion of budget support amount in total aid in WAEMU countries and the quality of
their public service delivery, measured by the efficiency of public expenditures.
Table 10
Fixed-Effects Regression Analysis Predicting Public Spending Efficiency from Share of
Budget Support in Total Aid with Covariates
Variable

β

SE

t

p
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Share of Budget support in

.0228

.00698

3.27

.002

Macroeconomic stability

.0023

.0001

20.42

.000

Corruption

.0014

.00003

4.37

.000

total aid

Note. F (3,94) = 250.52, p < .0000, R² = .6737
Table 11
Random Effects Regression Analysis Predicting Public Spending Efficiency from Share of
Budget Support in Total Aid with Covariates
β

SE

z

p

.02211

.00687

3.22

.001

Macroeconomic stability

.00233

.0001

20.82

.000

Corruption

.00145

.00003

4.56

.000

Variable
Share of Budget support in
total government revenue

Note. Wald chi2 (3) = 766.41, p < .0000, R² = .6753
RQ4: Relationship between GSE and the Share of Budget Support Amount in Total
Government Revenue
RQ4 was about whether there was positive relationship over time between the
share of budget support amount in total government revenue in WAEMU countries and
the quality of their public service delivery, measured by the efficiency of public
expenditures. The test of the directional hypothesis associated to RQ4 consisted of
regressing the efficiency coefficients over the proportion of budget support amount in
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total public revenues of the recipient country. Tables 12 and 13 show the results of the
regressions.
The regression results are significant for both the fixed-effect model F(3, 94) =
235.15, p <.000 and random-effects model Wald chi2(3) = 713.17, p< 0.000. The
likelihood ratio test (Fisher test) revealed the presence of fixed-effects, F (7, 94) = 50.93,
p< .0000. The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test indicated the existence of random
effects, chibar2(01) = 376.56, p <.0000. The Hausmann’s specification test confirmed
the presence of fixed effects, chi2(3) = 1.02, p = .7959.
The fixed-effects model provided the best estimates and was the most suitable for
explaining technical efficiency by the proportion of budget support amount in total public
revenues variable as well as the covariates of macroeconomic stability and level of
corruption. Budget support as a share of total government revenue, β = .0276, t = 2.06, p
= .0042 was significant, The Beta coefficient (.0276) indicates that there is a positive
relationship between the efficiency of government spending and the proportion of budget
support in total government revenue. The higher the volume of budget support a
government receives compare to its total revenue, the higher its spending efficiency.
Macroeconomic stability β = - .0024, t = 22.17, p < .0000 and the level of corruption, β =
- .0013, z = 3.96, p < .0000 were also significant, suggesting the generation of efficiency
gains as the proportion of budget support in total revenues increases. These results
supported the hypothesis that there is a relationship over time between the share of
budget support amount in total government revenue in WAEMU countries and the quality
of their public service delivery, measured by the efficiency of public expenditures.
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Table 12
Fixed-Effects Regression Analysis Predicting Public Spending Efficiency from Share of
Budget Support in Total Revenue with Covariates
β

SE

t

p

.02762

.0134

2.06

.042

Macroeconomic stability

.0025

.0001

22.17

.000

Corruption level

.0013

.00003

3.96

.000

Variable
Share of Budget support in
total government revenue

Note. F (3,94) = 233.15, p < .0000, R² = .6826
Table 13
Random Effects Regression Analysis Predicting Public Spending Efficiency from Share of
Budget Support in Total Revenue with Covariates
β

SE

z

P

.02627

.0132

1.98

.048

Macroeconomic stability

.00247

.0001

22.48

.000

Corruption level

.00136

.00003

4.19

.000

Variable
Share of Budget support in
total government revenue

Note. Wald chi2 (3) = 713.17, p < .0000, R² = .6848
RQ5: Influence of Initial Level of Governance on the Relationship between Budget
Support and the Efficiency of Public Expenditure
RQ5 was about whether there was a relationship between the amount of budget
support and the efficiency of public expenditure for WAEMU countries over time. The
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test of the directional hypothesis associated to RQ5 consisted of introducing the lag of the
efficiency coefficient variable in the previous regressions of public expenditure efficiency
over budget support variables. The lagged efficiency coefficient is the efficiency
coefficient a year before the current year. It measures the level of governance of a
country before its engagement with budget support. The same regressions were run while
replacing the lag of the efficiency coefficient by government effectiveness variable.
The results showed that for both fixed effect and random effect models, the lag of
the efficiency coefficient was significant for all budget support variables, including the
budget support amount variable, which was nonsignificant to predict changes in public
expenditure efficiency. For example, β = .8525, t = 14.22, p < .0000 with the budget
dummy variable and β = .863, t = 14.91, p < .0000 with the proportion of budget support
in government revenue for the fixed effect model. In the regressions, the various budget
support variables, including budget support dummy, the proportion of budget support in
total revenue, and the proportion of budget support in total aid, were nonsignificant.
These results suggested the possibility of a mediation role by the lag of the efficiency
coefficient (initial level of governance quality) concerning budget support and efficiency
coefficient (governance quality).
Table 14
Significance of Efficiency Coefficient Lag per Budget Support Variable Based on FixedEffect Regressions Results
Efficiency Coefficient Lag
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Budget Support Variable

Β

t

p

Budget Support Dummy

.8526

14.22

.000

Budget Support Amount

.8713

15.08

.000

Share of Budget support in total

.8630

14.91

.000

.8444

14.57

.000

government revenue
Share of Budget support in total aid

Table 15
Significance of Efficiency Coefficient Lag per Budget Support Variable Based on
Random-Effect Regressions Results
Efficiency Coefficient Lag
Budget Support Variable

Β

t

p

Budget Support Dummy

1.034

36.97

.000

Budget Support Amount

1.034

36.91

.000

Share of Budget support in total

1.033

36.90

.000

1.036

36.54

.000

government revenue
Share of Budget support in total aid

Baron and Kenny (1987) suggested three steps in conducting a mediation test.
The first step is to test the relationship between the dependent and independent variables.
If this relationship is significant, the second test is to add the third variable that is
suspected to potentially mediate the relationship between the dependent and independent
variable. If this third variable is significant while the independent becomes
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nonsignificant, the third step is to test the relationship between the third variable and the
independent variable. If this relationship is significant, then third variable is a mediator of
the relationship between the independent and dependent variable.
Following these steps, the test of the relationship between the lag of the technical
efficiency coefficient and the budget support variables was significant. There were
positive and significant relationships between the lagged technical efficiency coefficient
and the various budget support variables. These results indicate that the previous/initial
level of technical efficiency mediates the effect of budget support on public spending
efficiency. In other words, budget support is likely to trigger a self-sustaining dynamic of
public expenditure efficiency gains.
Table 16

Prediction of Efficiency Coefficients Lag by Budget Support Variables
β

Budget Support Variable

Fixed Effect

Random Effect

Budget Support Dummy

0,0160**

0,0154**

Budget Support Amount

0,0309

0,0299

Share of Budget support in total

0,0059*

0,0057*

0,0174*

0,0167*

government revenue
Share of Budget support in total aid
Note. legend: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001

The substitution of public expenditure efficiency coefficient lag with the World
Bank’s government effectiveness index did not yield significant results. The government
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effectiveness index variable was nonsignificant. The significance of budget support
variables (except for the dummy) also reduced in all regressions. The overall public
governance setting in the aid recipient country did not affect efficiency gains that budget
support can generate.
Table 17
Significance of Government Effectiveness Index per Budget Support Variable Based on
Fixed-Effect Regressions Results
Budget Support Variable

Β

t

p

Budget Support Dummy

-.001

-0.16

.871

Budget Support Amount

.005

0.61

.543

Share of Budget support in total

.005

0.61

.542

.004

0.43

.667

government revenue
Share of Budget support in total aid

Table 18
Significance of Government Effectiveness Index per Budget Support Variable Based on
Random-Effect Regressions Results
Budget Support Variable

Β

t

p

Budget Support Dummy

.006

0.71

.476

Budget Support Amount

.007

0.87

.385

Share of Budget support in total

.007

0.88

.378

.006

0.71

.476

government revenue
Share of Budget support in total aid
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Overall, the initial governance setting did not predict public expenditure
efficiency; neither did it predict the effect of budget support on public expenditure. The
initial/previous level of public expenditure efficiency predicts and mediate the impact of
the budget support on public expenditure efficiency. These results revealed some
ambiguity on the role of the initial overall governance setting on the prediction of GSE
efficiency by budget support.
RQ6: Influence of Political Context on the Relationship between Budget Support
and Public Expenditure Efficiency
From the literature review, it was not clear whether and how institutional quality
affects aid effectiveness. RQ6 was about whether level of democratization influences the
relationship between budget support and public expenditure efficiency in WAEMU
countries. The test of the directional hypothesis associated to RQ6 consisted of
introducing the democracy index variable in the previous regressions of public
expenditure efficiency over budget support variables. The same regressions were run
while replacing the democracy index variable by the political stability index variable.
The results showed that, for both fixed effect and random effect models, the
democracy index variable was significant for most budget support variables, including
the budget support amount variable. For example, β = .0713, t = 2.00, p = .048 with the
budget support dummy variable and β = .0696, t = 1.98, p = .051 with the proportion of
budget support in government revenue for the fixed effect model. The various budget
support variables, including budget support dummy, the proportion of budget support in
total revenue, and the proportion of budget support in total aid, were nonsignificant.
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These results suggested the possibility of mediation or moderator role by the political
context variable.
Table 19
Significance of Democracy Index per Budget Support Variable Based on Fixed-Effect
Regressions Results
Budget Support Variable

Β

t

p

Budget Support Dummy

0.0713

2.00

.048

Budget Support Amount

0.07195

2..02

.047

Share of Budget support in total government

0.0696

1.98

.051

0.6426

1.88

.064

revenue
Share of Budget support in total aid

Table 20
Significance of Democracy Index per Budget Support Variable Based on Random-Effects
Regressions Results
Budget Support Variable

Β

t

p

Budget Support Dummy

0.0701

2.05

.040

Budget Support Amount

0.0707

2.07

.039

Share of Budget support in total government

0.0687

2.03

.042

0.628

1.90

.057

revenue
Share of Budget support in total aid
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The substitution of a democracy index with a political stability index generated
significant results. The political stability index variable was significant. While the
significance level was higher than the democracy index variable, the coefficients were
lower. For example, β = 0.011, t = 4.24, p < .000 with the budget support dummy
variable and β = 0.011, t = 4.01, p < .000 with the proportion of budget support in
government revenue for the fixed effect model. The various budget support variables,
including budget support dummy, the proportion of budget support in total revenue, and
the proportion of budget support in total aid, were nonsignificant.
Table 21
Significance of Political Stability Index per Budget Support Variable Based on FixedEffects Regressions Results
Budget Support Variable

Β

t

p

Budget Support Dummy

0.011

4.24

.000

Budget Support Amount

0.011

4.26

.000

Share of Budget support in total

0.011

4.01

.000

0.01

3.60

.001

government revenue
Share of Budget support in total aid

Table 22
Significance of Political Stability Index per Budget Support Variable Based on RandomEffects Regressions Results
Budget Support Variable

Β

t

p
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Budget Support Dummy

0.009

2.85

.004

Budget Support Amount

0.009

2.95

.003

Share of Budget support in total

0.009

3.26

.001

0.009

3.13

.002

government revenue
Share of Budget support in total aid

Following Fairchild and Mackinon (2008)’s general model for testing moderation
effects, the test of the interaction variable budget support X political stability index was
significant. There were positive and significant relationships between the interaction
variable (budget support X political stability index) and the government spending
efficiency coefficient for all budget support variables. The introduction of the interaction
variable also yielded significant coefficients for the budget support variables and political
stability index variables. These results indicate that the political context mediates the
effect of budget support on public spending efficiency.
Overall, the political stability variable predicted public expenditure efficiency and
moderated the relationship between budget support and public expenditure efficiency.
These results supported the hypothesis that the political context measured by the level of
democratization moderates the relationship between budget support and public
expenditure efficiency in WAEMU countries.
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Table 23
Effect of Political Stability Index on the Relationship between Government Spending
Efficiency and Budget Support using Fixed-Effect Model
β

t

P

Budget Support Dummy

.000**

1.96

.053

Political Stability Index

.013***

4.78

.000

Budget Support X political

.000**

-2.95

.004

Macroeconomic Stability

.002***

20.46

.000

Corruption

.001***

3.74

.000

Variables

stability

Note: legend: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001

Table 24
Effect of Political Stability Index on the Relationship between Government Spending
Efficiency and Budget Support using Random-Effect Model
β

t

P

Budget Support Dummy

.000**

1.87

.061

Political Stability Index

.010***

3.62

.000

Budget Support X political

.000***

-2.65

.008

Macroeconomic Stability

.002***

18.89

.000

Corruption

.001***

3.89

.000

Variables

stability

Note: legend: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001
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Summary
The two SFA models yielded satisfactory public expenditure efficiency scores.
Public expenditures, corruption levels, and macroeconomic stability predict government
spending efficiency. Measures of political stability, population, and density were not
significant to predict the quality of public governance.
The benefits of budget support (dummy variable), the proportion of budget
support amount in total government revenues, and the proportion of budget support
amount in total aid predict government spending efficiency. The initial level of
governance quality mediates the relationship between government spending efficiency
and budget support for all budget support variables. The political stability index as well
as the democratization index moderates the relationship between government spending
efficiency and budget support for all budget support variables.
Various tests revealed that random-effects model better fit data for some
regressions, suggesting the presence of idiosyncrasies. Therefore, individual country
characteristics matter for the relationships between budget support and government
spending efficiency for selected variables. The effect of budget support on government
spending efficiency is not uniformly homogeneous.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Introduction
The purpose of the study was to explore the relationship between budget support
and quality of public governance measured by efficiency of public spending in the
production of human development. GSE coefficients as the dependent variable, were
estimated using two SFA models. The estimated GSE coefficients were further related to
budget support dummy, budget amount and the proportions of budget support amount in
total aid and in total government revenues to assess the relationships between public
governance quality and budget support.
This chapter consists of analyses of the results of multiple regressions to explain
implications for the research hypotheses. Donors’ fear of weak governance in the
neediest countries seems confirmed by findings as GSE coefficients were relatively low
for the WAEMU countries. Budget is an aid modality donors can use to provide the
neediest countries with ODA while provoking quality institutional changes in recipient
countries.
Interpretation of the Findings
Levels of Efficiency Coefficients in WAEMU Countries
Guinea-Bissau appears to be the least efficient in terms of GSE, with an average
GSE of 8.3% over the study period and inefficiency of up to 97.8%. Public expenditure in
Guinea Bissau is heavily dominated by operating expenses, while investment, particularly
in human capital, is low. According to the World Bank (2018), the country devoted 90%
of domestic resources to salaries and other operating expenses between 2010 and 2017.
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Although the share of public spending on health and education averaged 23% over the
period between 2010 and 2017, wages constitute more than 90% of these allocations.
There is, therefore, a situation where civil servants agents benefit from salaries but cannot
deliver minimum public service in the absence of materials and supplies.
Cote d'Ivoire is the most efficient country of the eight with an average GSE of
19.6%. The country represents 40% of the total GDP of the WAEMU currency area. It
has seen impressive economic and social developments in the 1980s in terms of
economic growth and human development before getting into a political crisis between
2002 and 2011. Since 2011, the country has been renewed with sustained economic
growth, but social outcomes remain mixed with a life expectancy of 57.4 years and mean
years of schooling of 5.2 years. The country still ranked 165th amongst 189 countries and
territories classified by the HDI in 2018.
Senegal is the most politically stable of the eight countries. The country has not
experienced any coup or violent conflict since its independence in 1960. Nonetheless,
levels of public spending efficiency remain low and on par with peers in the currency
area (less than 14% on average). The country devotes a significant share of its resources
to education (3.5% of GDP) and health (1.4%). However, it still ranks 166th with a life
expectancy of 67.7 years and mean years of schooling of 3.1 years.
Mali is the largest WAEMU country with a population density of 17 inhabitants
per square kilometer. Nevertheless, the country recorded an average GSE of 14.6% which
was above the averaged eight countries of 12.5%. The country does not, however, show
social outcomes that are significantly different than its peers in the sample. In terms of
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HDI, it was ranked 184th behind Benin (163) and Burkina Faso (182), which have an
average efficiency below the regional average, but ahead of Niger (189).
Ex-Ante Selectivity in Aid Allocation
Relatively low levels of GSE with an average of 12.5% and variability between
WAEMU countries from 8.3% in Guinea-Bissau to 20% in Cote d’Ivoire do not confirm
the theories of ex-ante selectivity in aid allocation. All eight countries received budget
support over the study period regardless of their level of efficiency. Between 1995 and
2015, there were 21 budget support disbursements in Guinea-Bissau, the least efficient
country, compared to an average of 15 disbursements for all eight countries. The average
budget support disbursements were 15.3 for Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, and Senegal with
average GSE levels above the average of the eight countries. There was an average of
14.4 budget support disbursements for the five other countries with an average GSE
levels below the community average. While I used an economic measure of public
governance quality, my results diverge from merit-based aid allocation Mounir (2015)
put forward. The findings instead suggest that merit-based motivations are not the
primary determinant in terms of the use of budget support by donors.
Estimations revealed the presence of random effects. There are specific
characteristics to each country which influence the benefits of budget support on public
service delivery. These country-specific effects indicate the use of country-specific
conditionalities by the donor when delivering budget support. These results are an
illustration of donors’ concerns regarding the aid recipient’s developmental preference as
Cordello and Dell’ Ariccia (2007) argued. While the OECD recommended that budget
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support policy measures should be technical, many budget support policy frameworks
include legal and political policy measures explicitly or implicitly. These policy measures
are incentives donors want to trigger for an explicit or implicit political objective. For
instance, there were countries where the budget support policy framework included the
adoption of a specific law. However, this adoption requires the parliament to be
established, meaning the organization of legislative elections.
Public Expenditure Efficiency Gains of Budget Support
Budget support aid modality generates efficiency gains in public spending. The
effect of budget support on public expenditure efficiency increases as the amount of aid
allocated through budget support represents a significant proportion of total public
resources or total aid received. These results confirm Swedlund (2012)’s findings that the
use of budget support by a donor provide it with a seat at the table, voice amplification
and the right to ask question in order to influence policy debates in the beneficiary
countries. Donors can strengthen their policy influence on public spending by increasing
the proportion of aid channeled through budget support. The fact that the proportion of
budget support in total government revenue was determinant of public expenditure
efficiency suggests that budget support can have countercyclical budgetary properties. In
a context where domestic government revenues are low or diminished compared to aid
received, the use of budget support can help to maintain efficient use of public resources,
including foreign aid.
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Budget Support and the Institutional Peril of Foreign Aid
The study results did not confirm the hypothesis of the institutional peril of
foreign aid argued by scholars like Asongu (2013). The initial level of public governance
quality mediates the effect of budget support on public expenditure efficiency. The more
efficient a country is before benefiting budget support, the more it will be possible for aid
providers to trigger a self-sustained dynamic of the efficiency of public services by using
budget support. The fact that the initial level of efficiency mediates the relationship
between budget support and institutional quality supports Mounir (2015)’s idea that the
budget support policy framework the donor and the recipient agree to implement
encourages the aid beneficiary to anticipate the reaction of the donor in an ex-post
political conditionality dynamic. In an aid contract based on budget support modality, the
beneficiary knows that its performance will determine the donor’s willingness to disburse
the pledged aid amount. The recipient is thus encouraged to reduce the asymmetry of
information and demonstrate to the donor its readiness to use aid effectively. However,
my study adds to the literature that the recipient’s consent to cooperate depends on the
weight of the expected aid in its total income.
According to Bourguignon and Platteau (2015), when the initial public
governance quality is too low in an aid recipient country compared to the best performing
countries, donors will exclude this recipient from aid allocation if the available aid is
limited. My finding is that aid can be effective in a recipient country with low public
governance quality if donors deliver a high proportion of total aid to be allocated to the
country through budget support. The imposition of disciplinary measures by donors
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through budget support seem to compensate the public governance quality gap between
the least-performing and best-performing countries and can influence the efficient use of
public resources by recipients with low public governance quality.
Limitations
The main limitation of this study was the assumption that any amount of aid
delivered through budget support modality indicates the donor's intention to influence
public governance quality in the recipient countries. As underlined earlier, budget support
is an instrument donor use to motivate aid recipients to undertake institutional changes
that will improve aid effectiveness. Therefore, the use of aid amount delivered through
budget support as the key independent variable in this study was based on the assumption
that any disbursement made by a donor within the framework of budget support indicates
an agreement between the donor and the recipient to implement policy reforms that
improves public governance quality in the recipient country. An additional unit of aid
amount delivered through budget support, is also a proxy of other policy reforms the
recipient government commits to implement. There is no distinction between sectoral and
general budget support in this study.
By using government spending efficiency as the primary dependent variable, I
assumed that the primary objective of improving governance settings in recipient
countries is to ensure that they spend public revenues efficiently The role of a responsible
and accountable government in a modern democratic society is to ensure that resources
are allocated efficiently for collective well-being. The idea that budget support can
influence the emergence of such governments in recipient countries translates the use of
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disciplining measures by donors to incite recipient governments to better allocate and
spend public resources, to produce development outcomes. As implication, aid recipients
allocate aid amount received through budget support in the same manner they use
government revenues.
The estimation of public expenditure efficiency coefficient was based on a human
development index which is a composite index of national income, education and health.
I thus assumed that the primary objective of a government in the considered WAEMU
countries for the study period was to advance human development as summarized by the
MDGs. Additionally, a limitation of the study is its geographical delimitation that may
affect the generalizability of the findings. Since WAEMU is a currency zone, this may
have influences on the results as these countries use harmonized public governance rules.
Therefore, the absence of comparable fiscal, monetary and foreign exchange policies may
reveal divergent results for other countries.
Recommendations
This study focuses on eight countries. Using a large sample of countries receiving
budget support could further improve the findings. With a larger sample of countries,
temporal variations and their implications could be tested while maintaining a suitable
level of degree of freedom and thus robustness. Another avenue for future research would
be breaking down the human development index and using each of the sub-indexes.
Specific outcome indicators regarding education and health could also be considered on
each dimension of the sub-index. This would make it possible to assess the contribution
of each dimension or component of the human development index to government
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spending efficiency and the relationship between each dimension and budget support. A
comparative study with project/program aid would be useful to assess the contribution of
budget support as an aid delivery modality to the efficient delivery of public services.
Other variables of public service delivery may also be tested.
Implications
The findings of my study have shown that Donors can use aid as an instrument to
improve governance in recipient countries. With budget support, donors have a policy
window not to ex-ante exclude the neediest recipient countries-especially - based on their
governance setting. Aid providers can allocate aid to countries with weak public
governance by imposing disciplinary measures thought support. When they do, aid
providers should incorporate in budget support policy framework policy measures to
improve the efficiency of the public service as this will result in increased development
expenditures in the recipient country. The disciplinary measures are likely to force those
in power in WAEMU countries to reduce aid diversion and effectively use aid to promote
human development in terms of education, health, and wealth creation. Aid will reach the
most impoverished populations in WAEMU countries.
If a significant portion of aid is channeled through conditional budget support, it
can strengthen the efficiency of public spending and improve the delivery of expected
public services. Recipient countries will be more sensitive to the disciplinary
requirements of donors if their resources are limited. For example, rather than suspending
aid for the neediest in times of political crisis, donors can use budget support to maintain
a minimum level of efficiency and public service. Thus, in a context of crisis such as
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political instability, which is the case for many fragile countries, it would be possible for
donors through budget support, to preserve a minimum level of aid effectiveness and
protect the poorest against deterioration of their precarious situation. The budget support
policy framework can incorporate measures such as pro-poor policies or expenditures and
donors can encourage governments to prioritize the most disadvantaged through better
allocation and use of aid.
The higher the amount of total aid a country receives, the more effective it will be
through conditional budget support in countries with weak governance. The more
countries receiving aid have a high level of own resources, the more it will be possible
for the donor to influence the proper use of these resources through budget support.
Therefore, using budget support in an aid-orphan country might not be relevant unless it
constitutes a significant share of government revenues. Also, using budget support in an
aid-darling country would be relevant if it represents a relative high proportion of total
aid the country benefits. In this case, donors can use budget support to help strengthen
social accountability and citizen control, not only on domestic resources but also on aid
received.
Another implication of the study is that the involvement of donors in fragile states
such as Guinea-Bissau amongst WAEMU countries where collection of domestic
resources is low can be done through budget support. Even in countries with abundant
domestic resources such as countries endowed with natural resources, budget support
gives the donor the possibility of influencing the use of the recipient’s own resources
efficiently. The absolute amount of budget support is not decisive. However, donors
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would benefit from coordinating their efforts to have more influence on the use of
resources.
Conclusion
The purpose of this quantitative research was to explore the relationship between
budget support and public expenditures efficiency as an indicator of public governance
quality in WAEMU countries. The analysis was made by assessing the possibility of
improving public service delivery through disciplinary measures accompanying budget
support amount donors deliver to WAEMU countries. The eight WAEMU countries
which benefited from budget support between 1995 and 2015 served as a field of
investigation. This currency area offered the advantage of comparable data given the
level of harmonization of budgetary policies within the region.
The analysis was conducted in three stages. First, efficiency was estimated using
SFA where a measure of human development was regressed against measures of GDP,
public expenditures, macroeconomic stability, and measures of population and density.
The results were efficiency scores for each of the WAEMU countries. Second, the effects
of budget support were studied in terms of its relationship with government efficiency
scores. The second stage consisted of regressing the institutional quality variable against
different budget support variables using panel data regressions involving both fixed and
random effects models. The third stage was to test for mediation and moderation of
selected variables like initial level of government effectiveness, political context and
democratization in relation to efficiency. The findings indicate that corruption level and
macroeconomic stability influence government efficiency levels. The benefits of budget
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support, the proportion of budget support amount in government revenues and the
proportion of budget support amount in total aid predict public expenditures efficiency.
This prediction is mediated by the initial level of efficiency and moderated by the
political context.
My findings have suggested that budget support can improve aid effectiveness,
regardless of the level of corruption and initial governance in the aid recipient country.
Budget support offers the opportunity to improve the delivery of public services. Through
budget support mechanism, donors and recipient associate money with policy inputs to
reinforce development outcomes resulting from the use of financial resources. Budget
support is, therefore, a means by which aid providers can reconcile need and governance
to continue provide the neediest and poorly governed countries with ODA. In addition to
technical disciplinary procedures usually considered in budget support, aid providers can
reinforce aid effectiveness by also considering measures that promote democratic
governance and/or political stability.

111
References
Adam, A., Delis, M., & Kammas, P. (2014). Fiscal decentralization and public sector
efficiency: Evidence from OECD countries. Economics of Governance, 15(1), 1749.
Afonso, A., Schuknecht, L., & Tanzi, V. (2010). Public sector efficiency: Evidence for
new EU member states and emerging markets. Applied Economics, 42, 21472164.
Agénor, P., & Ilmaz, D. (2013). Aid allocation, growth and welfare with productive
public goods. International Journal of Finance and Economics, 18(2), 103-127.
Aigner, D., Lovell, C., & Schmidt, P. (1977). Formulation and estimation of stochastic
frontier production function models. Journal of Econometrics, 6, 21-37.
Akramov, K. T. (2012). Foreign aid allocation, governance, and economic growth.
Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Altincekic, C., & Bearce, D, H. (2014). Why there should be no political foreign aid
curve. World Development, 64, 18-32.
Animoto, Y., & Kono, H. (2009). Foreign aid and recurrent cost: Donor competition, aid
proliferation, and budget support. Review of Development Economics, 13(2), 276287.
Antunes, A. F., Xu, K., James, C. D., Saksena, P., Van De Maele, N., Carrin, G., &
Evans, D. B. (2012). General budget support: Has it benefited the health sector?
Journal of Health Economics, 22, 1440-1451.

112
Askarov, Z., & Doucouliagos, H. (2013). Does aid improve democracy and governance?
A meta-regression analysis. Public Choice, 157, 601-628.
Asongu, S. A. (2013). On the effectiveness of foreign aid in institutional quality.
European Economics Letters, 2(1), 12-19.
Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1987). The moderator-mediator variable distinction in
social psychological research. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
51(6), 1173-1182.
Battese, G.E., & Coelli, T.J. (1988). Prediction of firm-level technical efficiencies: With
a generalized frontier production function and panel data. Journal of
Econometrics, 38, 387-399.
Berry, S. F., & Berry, W. (2014). Innovation and diffusion models in policy research. In
P. A. Sabatier & C.M. Weible (eds.). Theories of the policy process (3rd ed.).
Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Bigsten, A., & Tengstam, S. (2013). International coordination and effectiveness of aid.
World Development, 69, 75-85.
Biondo, K. D., & Orbie, J. (2014). The european commission’s implementation of budget
support and the governance incentive tranche in Ethiopia: Democracy promoter or
developmental donor? Third World Quarterly, 35(3), 411-427.
Booth, D. (2011). Aid, institutions and governance: What have we learned? Development
Policy Review, 29(s1), 5-26.
Bourguignon, F., & Platteau, J. F. (2015). Does aid availability affects effectiveness in
reducing poverty? A review articles. World Development 90(c), 6-16.

113
Breusch, T. S., & Pagan, A. R. (1979). A simple test for heteroskedasticity and random
coefficient variation. Econometrica. 47(5), 1287–1294.
Brown, S., & Swiss, L. (2013). The hollow ring of donor commitment: country
concentration and the decoupling of aid effectiveness norms from donor practice.
Development Policy Review 31(6), 737-55
Burnside, C., & Dollar, D. (2000). Aid, policies and growth. American Economic Review
90(4): 847-68.
Campbell, D. T., & Stanley, J. C. (1963). Experimental and quasi-experimental designs
for research. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Carter, P. (2016). The allocation of World Bank resources to leave no one behind.
Retrieved from https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resourcedocuments/10910.pdf.
Chmelarova, V. (2007). The Hausman test, and some alternatives, with heteroskedastic
data. Retrieved from http://etd.lsu.edu/docs/available/etd-01242007165928/unrestricted/Chmelarova_dis.pdf.
Clist, P. (2011). 25 years of aid allocation practice: Whither selectivity? World
Development, 39(10), 1724–1734.
Clist, P., Isopi, A., & Morrissey, O. (2012). Selectivity on aid modality: Determinants of
budget support from multilateral donors. The Review of International
Organizations 7(3), 267–284.
Commission UEMOA (1999). Acte additionnel No 44/99 portant pacte de convergence,
de stabilité, de croissance et de solidarité entre les états membres de l’UEMOA.

114
Retrieved from http://www.uemoa.int/sites/default/files/bibliotheque/pages__aa0499.pdf
Copestake, J., & Williams, R. (2014). Political-economy analysis, aid effectiveness and
the art of development management. Development Policy Review, 32(1): 133-154.
Cordello, T., & Dell’ Ariccia, G. (2007), Budget support versus project aid: A theoretical
appraisal, Economic Journal, 117, 1260-1279.
de la Croix, D., & Delavallade, C. (2013). Why corrupt governments may receive more
foreign aid. Oxford Economic Papers, 66(1): 51-66.
Del Biondo, K., & Ordie, J. (2014). The European Commission’s implementation of
budget support and the Governance Incentive Tranche in Ethiopia: democracy
promoter or developmental donor? Third World Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 3, 411–
427.
Dietrich, S. (2013). Bypass or Engage? Explaining Donor Delivery Tactics in Foreign
Aid Allocation. International Study Quarterly, 57(4): 698-712.
Dijkstra, G. (2012). Governance or poverty reduction? Assessing budget support in
Nicaragua. Journal of Development Studies, 49(1): 110–124.
Dreher, A., Nunnemkamp, P., Thiele, R. (2011). Are ‘new’ donors different? Comparing
allocation of bilateral aid between non-DAC and DAC donor countries. World
Development 39(11), 1950–1968.
Duta, N., Leeson, P, T., Wiliamson, C. R. (2013). The Ampliﬁcation Effect: Foreign
Aid’s Impact on Political Institutions. KYKLOS, 66 (2), 208–228.

115
Easterly, W. (2014). The tyranny of experts: Economists, dictators, and the forgotten
rights of the poor. New York: Basic Books.
Easterly, W., & Williamson, C, R. (2011). Rhetoric versus Reality: The Best and Worst
of Aid Agency Practices. World Development, 39(11), 1930–1949.
Edwards, S. (2015). Economic development and the effectiveness of foreign aid: A
historical perspective. KYKLOS, Vol. 68(3), 277–316.
European Commission (2012). Budget support guidelines. Retrieved from
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/methodology-budget-supportguidelines-201209_en_3.pdf
Fairchild, A., & Mackinon, D. (2008). A general model for testing mediation and
moderation effects. Prevention Science, 10(2):87-99.
Farrell, M. J. (1957). The measurement of productive efficiency. Journal of the Royal
Statistical Society, 120(3):253–281.
Faust, J., Leiderer, S., Scmitt, J. (2012). Financing poverty alleviation vs. promoting
democracy? Multi-donor budget support in Zambia. Democratization, 19(3), 438464.
Faye, M., & Niehaus, P. (2012). Political aid cycles. American Economic Review, 102(7),
3516-3530.
Fisher, R.A. (1954). Statistical methods for research workers. Oliver and Boyd.
Frankfort-Nachmias, C. & Nachmias D. (2007). Research methods in the social sciences,
7th Edition. Worth Publishers, 2007. VitalBook file.

116
Greene, W. (2005). Reconsidering heterogeneity in panel data estimators of the stochastic
frontier model. Journal of Econometrics, 126(2), 269-303.
Hansen, H., Tarp, F. (2000). Aid effectiveness disputed. Journal of International
Development. 12 (3), 375-398.
Hausman, J. A (1978). Specification tests in econometrics. Econometrica 46: 1251–1271.
Hayman, R. (2011). Budget support and democracy: a twist in the conditionality tale.
Third World Quarterly, 32(4), 2011, pp 673–688.
Hyman, D. N. (2014). Public finance: A contemporary application of theory to
policy (11th ed.). Stamford, CT: Cengage Learning.
Jelovac, I. & Vandeninden, F. (2008), How should donors give foreign aid? A theoretical
comparison of aid modalities. European Journal of Development Research, 26,
886–904.
Jondrow, J., Lovell, C.A.K., Materov, I.S., & Schmidt, P. (1982). On the estimation of
technical inefficiency in the stochastic frontier production function model.
Journal of Econometrics, 19, 233-238.
Jones, S., Tarp, F. (2015). Does foreign aid harm political institutions? Journal of
Development Economics, 118, 266–281.
Kalyvitis, S., & Vlachaki, I. (2012). When does more aid imply less democracy? An
empirical examination. European Journal of Political Economy, 28, 132-146.
Kalyvitis, S., Stengos, T., & Vlachaki, I. (2012). Are aid flows excessive or insufficient?
Estimating the growth impact of aid in threshold regressions. Scottish Journal of
Political Economy, 59(3), 298-315.

117
Kingdon, J. D. (2005). Policy paradox: the art of political decision making: In J. M.
Shafritz, K. S. Lane, K. S. & C. P. Borick, (Eds.), Classics of public policy (230233). New York, NY: Pearson Education. (Original work published 1995)
Kumbhakar, S. C. (1987). The speciﬁcation of technical and allocative inefﬁciency in
stochastic production and proﬁt frontiers. Journal of Econometrics, 34, 335–348.
Langbein, L. (2012). Public program evaluation: A statistical guide (2nd ed.). Armonk,
NY: ME Sharpe.
Masaki, T. (2016). Coup d’état and foreign aid. World Development, 79, 51–68.
Mechkova, V., & Sigman, R. (2016). Varieties of democracies (V-Dem). Retrieved from
https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/f9/08/f908eb53-c0e2-40f0-9294e067537d8f0b/v-dem_policybrief_5_2016.pdf.
Meeusen, W., & Van Den Broeck, J. (1977). Efficiency Estimation from Cobb-Douglas
Production Functions with Composed Error. International Economic Review,
18(2), 435-44.
Mikesell, J. L. (2014). Fiscal administration: Analysis and applications for the public
sector (9th ed.). Boston, MA: Wadsworth
Molenaers, D., Gagiano, A., Smets, L., & Dellepiane, S. (2015). What determines the
suspensions of budget support? World Development, 75, 62–73.
Molenaers, N. (2012). The Great divide? Donor perceptions of budget support, eligibility
and policy dialogue. Third World Quarterly, 33 (5), 791–806.
Molenaers, N., Dellepiane, S., & Faust, J. (2015). Political conditionality and foreign aid.
World Development, 75, 2–12.

118
Morissey, O. (2015). Aid and government fiscal behavior: assessing recent evidence.
World Development, 69, pp. 98–105.
Mosley, P., Suleiman, A. (2005). Budget support, conditionality and poverty. Sheffield
Economic Research Paper Series. Retrived from //eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Niskanen, W. N. (1994). Bureaucracy and Public Economics. Fairfax, Va.: The Locke
Institute.
O’Sullivan, E., Rassel, G. R., & Berner, M. (2008). Research methods for public
administrators (5th ed.). New York, NY: Pearson, Longman.
Ohemeng, F. L. K., & Grant, J. K. (2014). Neither public nor private: The efficacy of
mixed model public service delivery in two Canadian municipalities. Canadian
Public Adinistration, 57 (4), 548-572
Okada, K., & Samreth, S. (2012). The effect of foreign aid on corruption: A quantile
regression approach. Economics Letters, 115(2), 240–243
Organization of Economic Cooperation for Development (2012). The Busan Partnership
for Effective Development Cooperation. Retrieved from
http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/49650173.pdf
Organization of Economic Cooperation for Development (2012). The Paris declaration
for aid effectiveness and the Accra agenda for actions. Retrieved from
http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/34428351.pdf
Organization of Economic Cooperation for Development (2012). The Busan Partnership
for Effective Development Cooperation. Retrieved from
http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/49650173.pdf

119
Ostrom, E., Cox, M., & Schlager, E. (2014). An assessment of the institutional analysis
and development framework and introduction of the social-ecological framework:
In Sabatier, P. A., & Weible, C. M. (Eds.). (2014). Theories of the policy
process (3rd ed.). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Quibria, M. G. (2014). Aid effectiveness: research, policy and unresolved issues.
Development Studies Research, 1(1), 75-87.
Qian, N., Nunn, N. (2014). US food aid and civil conflict. American Economic Review,
104(6), 1630-1666.
Ravallion, M. (2014). On the role of aid in the great escape. Review of Income and
Wealth, 60 (4), 967-984.
Reinsberg, B. (2015). Foreign aid responses to political liberalizations. World
Development, 75, 46–61.
Samuelson, P. A. (1954). The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure. Review of Economics
and Statistics, 36, 387–389.
Selaya, P., Thiele, R. (2012). The impact of aid on bureaucratic quality: Does the mode
of delivery matter? Journal of International Development, 24, 379-386.
Skorobogatova, N. (2012). Macroeconomic instability: its causes and consequences for
the economy of Ukraine. Eastern Journal of European Studies, 7(1), 63-80.
Sow, M., & Razafimahefa, I. F. (2015). Fiscal Decentralization and the Efficiency of
Public Service Delivery. IMF Working Paper.

120
Swedlund, H. J.. (2013). From donorship to ownership? Budget support and donor
influence in Rwanda and Tanzania. Public Administration and Development, 33,
357–370.
Tavakoli, H., & Gregory, S. (2013). Back under the microscope: Insights from evidence
on budget support. Development Policy Review, 31 (1): 59-74.
Transparency International (2016). Corruption perception index 2016. Retrieved from
https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016
Ulbæk, S., & Nøhr, H. (2014). Evaluation of Danish development assistance –
experiences and new approaches. Journal of Development Effectiveness, 6 (4),
451-460.
United Nations Development Programme (1990). Human development report 1990.
Retrieved from
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/219/hdr_1990_en_complete_nostats.
pdf
Wiliamson, O. E. (2014). The economics of organization: the transaction cost approach:
In Shafritz, J. M., Ott, J. S., & Jang, Y. S. (Eds.). (2016). Classics of organization
theory. (8th ed). Belmont, CA: Wadworth, Cengage Learning. Pp. 334-336.
ISBN: 978-1-285-87027-4
Winters, M., & Martinez, G. (2015). The role of governance in determining foreign aid
flow composition. World Development, 66, 516–531.
World Bank (2018). Guinea-Bissau - Public expenditure review: Managing public
finance for development. Retrieved from

121
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/934031547818643963/pdf/133866PER-P164582-GuineaBissauPERJuneRevisedCleanforPPT.pdf
World Bank (2016). Senegal - Social Protection public expenditure review 2010-2015.
Retrieved from
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/910231510809862054/pdf/121420v2-FRENCH-REVISED-Senegal-rapport-danalyse-Revue-des-dépensespubliques-de-protection.pdf
World Bank (2010). Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC) – An Evaluation of
World Bank Support. Washington, DC: Independent Evaluation Group, World
Bank.

122
Appendix A: Correlation Table
Variables

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

(13)

(14)

(15)

(16)

(17)

(18)

(19)

(20)

(21)

(22)

(1) hdi

1.000

(2) gov_rev

0.290

1.000

(3) gov_dep

0.343

0.975

1.000

(4) gov_int

0.332

0.770

0.768

1.000

(5) gov_net

0.335

0.971

0.998

0.726

1.000

(6) oda_tot

0.260

0.374

0.217

0.032

0.236

1.000

(7) bsp

0.264

0.209

0.036

0.110

0.049

0.935

1.000

(8) bspdum

0.285

0.032

0.011

0.329

0.021

0.227

0.220

1.000

(9) gdp

0.322

0.960

0.968

0.834

0.957

0.157

0.022

0.083

1.000

(10) govgdp

0.027

0.114

0.174

0.268

0.214

0.274

0.080

0.175

0.047

1.000

(11) bspgdp

0.340

0.006

0.167

0.200

0.160

0.811

0.907

0.189

0.169

0.002

1.000

(12)
gov_net_gdp

0.027

0.114

0.174

0.268

0.214

0.274

0.080

0.175

0.047

1.000

0.002

1.000

(13)
bspgov_rev

0.444

0.142

0.282

0.339

0.270

0.704

0.816

0.347

0.288

0.006

0.912

0.006

1.000

(14)
bspoda_tot

0.305

0.048

0.006

0.251

0.019

0.480

0.570

0.677

0.011

0.019

0.515

0.019

0.697

1.000

(15) pol

0.064

0.043

0.052

0.201

0.076

0.189

0.121

0.361

0.032

0.366

0.029

0.366

0.084

0.132

1.000

(16) pol2

0.064

0.377

0.372

0.428

0.357

0.080

0.137

0.293

0.459

0.166

0.142

0.166

0.174

0.197

0.462

1.000

(17)
macro_s

0.331

0.606

0.601

0.415

0.604

0.116

0.070

0.101

0.666

0.076

0.098

0.076

0.137

0.158

0.200

0.466

1.000

(18) pop_s

0.185

0.786

0.777

0.556

0.779

0.352

0.177

0.026

0.782

0.181

0.025

0.181

0.141

0.115

0.217

0.450

0.503

1.000

(19) pop_d

0.750

0.028

0.069

0.183

0.055

0.297

0.286

0.528

0.048

0.015

0.299

0.015

0.422

0.478

0.096

0.238

0.071

0.302

1.000

(20) educ

0.739

0.314

0.320

0.510

0.293

0.300

0.271

0.652

0.383

0.235

0.284

0.235

0.443

0.504

0.356

0.202

0.379

0.090

0.733

1.000

(21) educ2

0.875

0.012

0.020

0.107

0.011

0.309

0.246

0.413

0.029

0.109

0.257

0.109

0.295

0.267

0.268

0.110

0.304

0.423

0.780

0.754

1.000

(22) corr

0.166

0.234

0.291

0.043

0.317

0.185

0.051

0.307

0.155

0.480

0.126

0.480

0.184

0.070

0.576

0.326

0.036

0.289

0.106

0.271

0.057

1.000

(23) corr2

0.085

0.217

0.246

0.001

0.265

0.245

0.137

0.396

0.143

0.324

0.026

0.324

0.070

0.138

0.634

0.404

0.275

0.320

0.071

0.414

0.388

0.768

(23)

1.000
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Appendix B: Estimation of Efficiency Coefficients
Jondrow et al (1982)
True fixed-effects model (half-normal)
Group variable: pays1
Time variable: year

Number of obs =
176
Number of groups =
8
Obs per group: min =
22
avg = 22,0
max = 22
Prob > chi2 = 0,0000
Wald chi2(2) = 713,30

Log likelihood = 469,8317
hdi
Frontier
gov_net
macro_s
Usigma
_cons
Vsigma
_cons
sigma_u
sigma_v
lambda

Coef.

Std.Err.

Z

P>z

[95%Conf.

Interval]

,0000458
,0009766

3,91e-06
,0001082

11,69
9,03

0,000
0,000

,0000381
,0007645

,0000534
,0011886

-7,218909

,2000037

-36,09

0,000

-7,610909

-6,826909

-9,859782
,0270666
,0072273
3,745056

,5219419
,0027067
,0018861
,0042533

-18,89
10,00
3,83
880,51

0,000
0,000
0,000
0,000

-10,88277
,0222491
,0043335
3,73672

-8,836795
,0329273
,0120535
3,753393

Battese and Coelli (1988)
True fixed-effects model (truncated-normal)
Group variable: pays1
Time variable: year

Number of obs =
176
Number of groups =
8
Obs per group: min =
22
avg = 22,0
max =
22
Prob > chi2 = 0,0000
Wald chi2(2) = 757,41

Log likelihood = 483,2551
hdi
Frontier
gov_net
macro_s
Mu
_cons
Usigma
_cons
Vsigma
_cons
sigma_u
sigma_v
lambda

Coef.

Std.Err.

z

P>z

[95%Conf.

Interval]

.0000532
.0008997

3.24e-06
.0000778

16.44
11.56

0.000
0.000

.0000469
.0007471

.0000596
.0010522

-24.38288

65.25089

-0.37

0.709

-152.2723

103.5065

-.8583319

2.673401

-0.32

0.748

-6.098101

4.381437

-10.12967
.6510519
.006315
103.0969

.4091437
.8702613
.0012919
.8702878

-24.76
0.75
4.89
118.46

0.000
0.454
0.000
0.000

-10.93158
.0474039
.004229
101.3912

-9.327764
8.941636
.0094298
104.8026
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Appendix C: Levels of Inefficiency
Variable
ineff_jn82~n
ineff_bc88~n

Pays

Obs
176
176

Mean
.8746907
.8766275

Variance Std. Dev
.0023582 .0485614
.0027203 .0521568

Min
.6655428
.6458101

Max
.9779519
.9793357

Variable

Mean

p50

Variance

sd

min

max

ineff_jn82~n

.8919995

.8973273

.0008937

.0298953

.8344421

.9405446

ineff_bc88~n

.8951965

.9007773

.0009418

.0306891

.8340414

.943987

ineff_jn82~n

.880433

.8893657

.0011738

.0342602

.8209638

.9291212

ineff_bc88~n

.8817303

.8915913

.001336

.0365507

.8171456

.9323546

ineff_jn82~n

.8041907

.8187746

.0036421

.0603498

.6655428

.8899551

ineff_bc88~n

.7995348

.8163496

.0042673

.0653243

.6458101

.8895658

ineff_jn82~n

.9165315

.9150609

.0005928

.0243475

.8886813

.9779519

ineff_bc88~n

.9224052

.9211973

.0005145

.0226835

.8960081

.9793357

ineff_jn82~n

.8535265

.863311

.0012445

.0352777

.78584

.9079115

ineff_bc88~n

.8568815

.8668615

.0013546

.0368051

.7850065

.9124921

ineff_jn82~n

.8905181

.9005517

.0009882

.0314354

.8292708

.932228

ineff_bc88~n

.8936217

.90476

.001121

.0334808

.8267648

.9359555

ineff_jn82~n

.8606772

.8697207

.0015895

.0398682

.797365

.9164798

ineff_bc88~n

.8590277

.8688396

.001921

.0438289

.7887455

.9192768

ineff_jn82~n

.8996493

.9075533

.0005478

.0234055

.8591654

.9367778

ineff_bc88~n

.904622

.9128626

.0005466

.0233787

.8636042

.9405844

Bénin

BurkinaFaso

Cote
d'Ivoire

Guinea
Bissau

Mali

Niger

Sénégal

Togo
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Appendix D: Levels of Efficiency
Variable

Mean

p50

sd

variance

min

max

eff_jn82_hn

.1253093

.1137091

.0485614

.0023582

.0220481

.3344572

eff_bc88_tn

.1233725

.110612

.0521568

.0027203

.0206643

.3541899

Pays
Bénin

BurkinaFaso
Cote
d'Ivoire
Guinea
Bissau

Variable

Mean

p50

variance

sd

min

max

eff_jn82_hn
eff_bc88_tn

.1080005
.1048035

.1026727
.0992227

.0298953
.0306892

.0008937
.0009418

.0594554
.056013

.1655579
.1659587

eff_jn82_hn
eff_bc88_tn

.119567
.1182697

.1106343
.1084087

.0342602
.0365507

.0011738
.001336

.0708788
.0676454

.1790362
.1828544

eff_jn82_hn
eff_bc88_tn

.1958093
.2004652

.1812254
.1836504

.0603498
.0653243

.0036421
.0042673

.1100449
.1104342

.3344572
.3541899

eff_jn82_hn
eff_bc88_tn

.0834685
.0775948

.0849391
.0788027

.0243475
.0226835

.0005928
.0005145

.0220481
.0206643

.1113187
.1039918

eff_jn82_hn
eff_bc88_tn

.1464735
.1431185

.136689
.1331385

.0352777
.0368051

.0012445
.0013546

.0920885
.0875079

.21416
.2149935

eff_jn82_hn
eff_bc88_tn

.1094819
.1063783

.0994483
.09524

.0314354
.0334808

.0009882
.001121

.067772
.0640445

.1707291
.1732352

eff_jn82_hn
eff_bc88_tn

.1393228
.1409723

.1302793
.1311604

.0398682
.0438289

.0015895
.001921

.0835202
.0807232

.2026351
.2112545

eff_jn82_hn
eff_bc88_tn

.1003507
.095378

.0924467
.0871374

.0234055
.0233787

.0005478
.0005466

.0632222
.0594156

.1408346
.1363958

Mali

Niger

Sénégal

Togo

